

# PL SC 551: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

Sona N. Golder

## **Course information:**

Time: Thursday 9:30 - 12:30, Pond Lab 236

## **Contact information for Professor:**

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## **Course Description**

Political institutions create incentives that influence the strategic choices made by political actors. They are in some sense the “rules of the game” in political life, and are themselves created to solve political problems. Some of the general problems that institutions might resolve are the aggregation of preferences, collective action, and the delegation of power. Although we will begin by examining various institutional solutions individually, later in the course we will think about how they may be connected. For instance, solving a collective action problem may involve delegation. We will focus on the trade-offs involved in using institutions to construct order in society.

Many of the readings use game-theoretic models and/or statistical analyses. It is assumed that all of the students have had some experience with these approaches (ideally introductory classes in *both* game theory and econometrics). One objective of this course is to familiarize the students with some of the models that are often used in the institutions literature, as well as some of the econometric techniques and choices frequently applied when testing institutional theories. As part of your preparation for class, you are expected to spend a significant amount of time working your way through the models in the readings. We will also devote time in class to discuss both the formal and statistical models used in this literature. The second objective of the course is to give students an array of theoretical approaches for use in their own research. The general theories as well as the specific applications are designed to be relevant across political science subfields, and you are explicitly encouraged to explore the ways in which models traditionally used in one subfield might be useful in others.

## **Required Texts:**

- Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2005. *Setting the Agenda*. Cambridge.
- John D. Huber and Charles R. Shipan. 2002. *Deliberate Discretion: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy*. Cambridge.
- Elinor Ostrom. 1990. *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. Cambridge.
- Kenneth A. Shepsle. 2010. *Analyzing Politics* (2nd Edition). Norton.

In addition to the books listed above, we will read articles, book chapters, and unpublished manuscripts. Some additional 'recommended readings' are listed below each topic on the schedule. These are included as a preliminary (and non-exhaustive) guide for further reading. The 'background readings' included for some weeks provide useful context for the required readings. It is assumed that you have seen the material contained in the background readings before (although it might have been from a different source). Please examine these readings so that you can determine the extent to which you need to review the concepts covered therein.

## Grading

- Participation: 20%. All students are required to have completed the readings for each week before class begins, and *everyone* should be prepared to discuss the readings during class. Intelligent participation in departmental talks and at conferences will be highly valued throughout your professional career and you should practice this ability now. I expect you to provide evidence that you have done the readings in a thoughtful and careful manner.
- Discussion leadership: 20%. Each student will be assigned two seminars to lead. Students should prepare a list of discussion questions, and e-mail them to the rest of the class by 4 pm of the Tuesday before the class they lead. The depth of and preparation evidenced in these questions, along with the leading of the seminar itself, will determine the student's grade.
- Final exam: 60%. The exam will be take-home and is due on December 17, 2013 by 4:00pm. The exam questions are attached to this syllabus.

## Schedule

### APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF INSTITUTIONS

**Week 1: August 29** — Introduction.

BACKGROUND READING:

Kenneth A. Shepsle. 2010. *Analyzing Politics*. Norton. Chapters 1 - 2.

**Week 2: September 5** — From Old to New Institutionalism.

REQUIRED READING:

J. March and J. Olsen. 1984 "The New Institutionalism: Organization Factors in Political Life." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 78, No. 3, pp. 734-749.

Elinor Ostrom. 1986. "An Agenda for the Study of Institutions." *Public Choice* 48(1): 3-25.  
John Carey. 2000. "Parchment, Equilibria, and Institutions." *Comparative Political Studies* 33(6/7): 735-761.  
Daniel Diermeier and Keith Krehbiel. 2003. "Institutionalism as a Methodology." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 15(2): 123-144.  
Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky. 2004. "Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda." *Perspectives on Politics* 2(4): 725-739.

RECOMMENDED READING:

- Elinor Ostrom. 2009. *Understanding Institutional Diversity*. Princeton University Press.

AGGREGATING PREFERENCES

**Week 3: September 12** — Aggregation in the Absence of Institutions: Why Institutions are Needed.

BACKGROUND READING:

Nolan McCarty and Adam Meirowitz. 2007. *Political Game Theory: An Introduction*. Cambridge. Chapter 4.

REQUIRED READING:

Kenneth A. Shepsle. 2010. *Analyzing Politics*. Norton. Chapters 3 - 4.  
William H. Riker. 1988 [1982]. *Liberalism Against Populism*. Waveland Press. Chapters 3-6 (pp. 41-168).  
Mancur Olson. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action*. Harvard University Press. Chapters 1-2.

RECOMMENDED READING:

- Catherine Hafer. 2006. "On the Origins of Property Rights: Conflict and Production in the State of Nature." *Review of Economic Studies* 73(1): 119-43.
- Arthur Lupia and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2005. "Lost in Translation: Social Choice Theory is Misapplied Against Legislative Intent." *Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues* 14: 585-617.
- Amartya Sen. 1970. *Collective Choice and Social Welfare*. Holden-Day Inc.
- Kenneth May. 1952. "A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Rule." *Econometrica* 20(4):680-684.

**Week 4: September 19** — Elections, Voting Rules, and Party Systems: Spatial Location

REQUIRED READING:

- Kenneth A. Shepsle. 2010. *Analyzing Politics*. Norton. Chapter 5.
- Anthony Downs. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. Harper and Row. Chapter 8.
- Gary W. Cox. 1990. "Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems". *American Journal of Political Science* 34(4): 903-935.
- Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast. 1981. "Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice". *Public Choice* 37(3): 503-519.
- Matt Golder and Jacek Stramski. 2010. "Ideological Congruence and Electoral Institutions." *American Journal of Political Science* 54(1): 90-106.

RECOMMENDED READING:

- Kathleen Bawn and Zeynep Somer-Topcu. 2012. "Government versus Opposition at the Polls: How Governing Status Changes the Impact of Policy Positions." *American Journal of Political Science* 56(2): 433-446.
- Ernesto Calvo and Timothy Hellwig. 2011. "Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives under Different Electoral Systems." *American Journal of Political Science* 55(1): 2741.
- James Adams and Zeynep Somer-Topcu. 2009. "Do Parties Adjust Their Policies in Response to Rival Parties' Policy Shifts? Spatial Theory and the Dynamics of Party Competition in Twenty-Five Postwar Democracies." *British Journal of Political Science* 39(4): 825-846.
- Orit Kedar. 2005. "When Moderate Voters Prefer Extreme Parties: Policy Balancing in Parliamentary Elections." *American Political Science Review* 99(2): 185-199.
- Ken Kollman, Scott E. Page, and John H. Miller. 1992. "Adaptive Parties in Spatial Elections". *American Political Science Review*. 86: 929-37.
- Thomas Palfrey. 1984. "Spatial Equilibria with Entry." *Review of Economic Studies* 51: 139-156.
- Duncan Black. 1987 [1958]. *The Theory of Committees and Elections*. Kluwer. Selections.

**Week 5: September 26** – Electoral Rules and Party Systems.

BACKGROUND READING:

- Thomas Brambor, William Clark and Matt Golder. 2006. "Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses." *Political Analysis* 14: 63-82.

REQUIRED READING:

- Kenneth A. Shepsle. 2010. *Analyzing Politics*. Norton. Chapters 6-7.
- Gary Cox. 1997. *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*. Cambridge. Chapters 1-2, 7, 10.

Pradeep Chhibber and Ken Kollman. 1998. "Party aggregation and the number of parties in India and the United States." *American Political Science Review* 92(2): 329-342.

William R. Clark and Matt Golder. 2006. "Rehabilitating Duverger's Theory: Testing the Mechanical and Strategic Modifying Effects of Electoral Laws." *Comparative Political Studies* 39: 679-708.

Miki Caul Kittilson and Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer. 2010. "Engaging Citizens: The Role of Power-Sharing Institutions." *Journal of Politics* 72(4): 990-1002.

RECOMMENDED READING:

- Heather Stoll. 2013. *Changing Societies, Changing Party Systems*. Cambridge.
- Eric C. C. Chang and Miriam A. Golden. 2007. "Electoral Systems, District Magnitude and Corruption." *British Journal of Political Science* 37(1): 115-137.
- Joel D. Barkan, Paul J. Densham, and Gerard Rushton. 2006. "Space Matters: Designing Better Electoral Systems for Emerging Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 50: 926-939.
- Pradeep K. Chhibber and Ken Kollman. 2004. *The Formation of National Party Systems*. Princeton.
- Kenneth Benoit. 2004. "Models of Electoral System Change." *Electoral Studies* 23 (3): 363-389.
- William H. Riker. 1982. "The Two-Party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science." *The American Political Science Review* 76(4): 753-766.
- Maurice Duverger. 1963 [1954]. *Political Parties*. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Selections.

**Week 6: October 3** — Coalition Formation: Parties and Governments.

BACKGROUND READING:

McCarty and Meirowitz. 2007. *Political Game Theory*. Cambridge. Chapter 7 (Section 8), and Chapter 10 (Section 3).

REQUIRED READING:

Kenneth A. Shepsle. 2010. *Analyzing Politics*. Norton. Chapter 16.

David P. Baron and John Ferejohn. 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures". *American Political Science Review*, 83(4):1181-206.

John D. Huber. 1996. "The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies". *American Political Science Review* 90(2): 269-282.

Kathleen Bawn and Frances Rosenbluth. 2006. "Short versus Long Coalitions: Electoral Accountability and the Size of the Public Sector." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(2): 251-265.

Matt Golder, Sona N. Golder, and David A. Siegel. "Modeling the Institutional Foundations of Parliamentary Government Formation." *Journal of Politics* 74: 427-445.

RECOMMENDED READING:

- Anna Bassi. 2013. “A Model of Endogenous Government Formation.” *American Journal of Political Science*. Forthcoming.
- Sona N. Golder and Jacquelyn A. Thomas. 2013. “Portfolio Allocation and the Vote of No Confidence.” *British Journal of Political Science*. Forthcoming.
- Michael Laver, Scott de Marchi, and Hande Mutlu. 2011. “Negotiations in Legislatures over Government Formation.” *Public Choice* 147: 285-304.
- Sona N. Golder. 2006. *The Logic of Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation*. Ohio State University Press.
- Michael Laver and Norman Schofield. 1998 [1990]. *Multiparty Government*. Michigan.
- David Austen-Smith and Jeff Banks. 1988. “Elections, Coalitions and Legislative Outcomes”. *American Political Science Review* 82: 405-22.

## COOPERATION/COORDINATION

### **Week 7: October 10** — Collective Action.

#### REQUIRED READING:

Kenneth A. Shepsle. 2010. *Analyzing Politics*. Norton. Chapters 8 - 10.

Elinor Ostrom. 1990. *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. Cambridge.

#### RECOMMENDED READING:

- Jack Knight. 1992. *Institutions and Social Conflict*. Cambridge.
- Garrett Hardin. 1968. “Tragedy of the Commons” *Science* 162: 1243-1248.

### **Week 8: October 17** - Constitutions, Commitment, and Coordination.

#### REQUIRED READING:

Barry R. Weingast. 1997. “The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law”. *American Political Science Review* 91: 245-263.

Leonard Wantchekon. 2004. “The Paradox of ‘Warlord’ Democracy: A Theoretical Investigation.” *American Political Science Review* 98(1): 17-33.

James D. Fearon. 2011. “Self-Enforcing Democracy”. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 126(4): 1661-1708.

Timur Kuran. 1991. “Now out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989.” *World Politics* 44: 748.

Jeffrey K. Staton and Christopher Reenock. 2010. "Substitutable Protections: Socioeconomic Insulation and Credible Commitment Devices." *Political Research Quarterly* 63(1): 115-128.

RECOMMENDED READING:

- Andrew T. Little. 2012. "Elections, Fraud, and Election Monitoring in the Shadow of Revolution." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 7(4): 249-83.
- David Stasavage. 2002. "Private Investment and Political Institutions." *Economics & Politics* 14(1): 41-63.
- Leonard Wantchekon. 2000. "Credible Power-Sharing Agreements: Theory with Evidence from South Africa and Lebanon." *Constitutional Political Economy* 11: 339-352.
- Adam Przeworski. 1991. *Democracy and the Market*. Cambridge.
- Milgrom, Paul R., Douglass C. North, and Barry R. Weingast. 1990. "The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs." *Economics and Politics* 2: 1-23.
- Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast. 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England." *The Journal of Economic History* 49: 803-832.

**Week 9: October 24** — Identity I.

BACKGROUND READING:

McCarty and Meirowitz. 2007. *Political Game Theory*. Chapter 9 (Section 6).

REQUIRED READING:

Daniel N. Posner. 2005. *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*. Cambridge. Chapters 1-2, 5, 7.  
Daniel N. Posner. 2004. "The Political Salience of Cultural Difference: Why Chewas and Tumbukas are Allies in Zambia and Adversaries in Malawi". *American Political Science Review* 98(4): 529-545.

Kanchan Chandra and Cilanne Boulet. 2005. "Ethnic Diversity and Democratic Stability." Unpublished manuscript, NYU.

James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. 1996. "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation". *American Political Science Review* 90(4): 715-735.

Jenna Bednar and Scott E. Page. 2006. "Can Game(s) Theory Explain Culture? The Emergence of Cultural Behavior within Multiple Games". *Rationality and Society* 18(4).

RECOMMENDED READING:

- Nahomi Ichino and Noah L. Nathan. 2013. "Crossing the Line: Local Ethnic Geography and Voting in Ghana." *American Political Science Review* 107(2): 344-61.

- Amy. H. Liu. 2011. “Linguistic Effects of Political Institutions.” *Journal of Politics* 73(1): 125-139.
- Daniel N. Posner. 2007. “Regime Change and Ethnic Cleavages in Africa”. *Comparative Political Studies* 40, 11, pp. 1302-1327.
- David D. Laitin. 1995. “Marginality: A Microperspective”. *Rationality and Society* 7: 31-57.

## **Week 10: October 31** — Identity II.

### REQUIRED READING:

Kanchan Chandra. 2005. “Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability”. *Perspectives on Politics* 3(2): 235-252.

Albert Alesina, Reza Baqir, and William Easterly. 1999. “Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions.” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*:1243-1284.

James Habyarimana, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N. Posner, and Jeremy Weinstein. 2007. “Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?.” *American Political Science Review*. 101(4): 709-725.

Jessica Trounstein and Jacob Rugh. 2011. “The Provision of Local Public Goods in Diverse Communities.” *Journal of Politics* 73(4): 1038-1050.

Elizabeth Maggie Penn. 2008. “Citizenship versus Ethnicity: The Role of Institutions in Shaping Identity Choice.” *Journal of Politics* 70: 956-973.

### RECOMMENDED READING:

- James Habyarimana, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N. Posner, and Jeremy Weinstein. 2009. *Coethnicity: Diversity and the Dilemmas of Collective Action*. Russell Sage Foundation.
- Kimuli Kasara. 2007. “Tax Me If You Can: Ethnic Geography, Democracy, and the Taxation of Agriculture in Africa.” *American Political Science Review* 101(1): 159-172.
- Dawn Brancati. 2006. “Decentralization: Fueling the Fire or Dampening the Flames of Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism?” *International Organization*, (July): 651-685.
- Kanchan Chandra. 2004. *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Headcounts in India*. Cambridge.

## **Week 11: November 7** - Domestic Institutions and International Cooperation.

### BACKGROUND READING:

Martin J. Osborne. 2004. *An Introduction to Game Theory*. Oxford University Press. Chapter 14.

### REQUIRED READING:



Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith. 2000. "Trust and Cooperation through Agent Specific Punishments." *International Organization* 54(4): 809-824.

Courtenay R. Conrad and Emily Hencken Ritter. 2013. "Treaties, Tenure, and Torture: The Conflicting Domestic Effects of International Law." *Journal of Politics* 75(2): 397-409.

Stephanie J. Rickard. 2012. "A Non-Tariff Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics: Government Subsidies and Electoral Institutions." *International Studies Quarterly* 56(4): 777-785.

#### RECOMMENDED READING:

- Courtenay R. Conrad. 2013. "Divergent Incentives for Dictators: Domestic Institutions and (International Promises Not to) Torture." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*
- Daniel W. Hill. 2010. "Estimating the Effects of Human Rights Treaties on State Behavior." *Journal of Politics* 72 (4): 1161-74.
- Monika Nalepa. 2010. "Captured Commitments: An Analytic Narrative Approach to Transitions with Transitional Justice." *World Politics* 62(2): 341-80.
- Jeffrey K. Staton and Emilia J. Powell. 2009. "Domestic Judicial Institutions and Human Rights Treaty Violation." *International Studies Quarterly* 53(1): 149-174.
- Brett Ashley Leeds, Michaela Mattes, and Jeremy S. Vogel. 2009. "Interests, Institutions, and the Reliability of International Commitments." *American Journal of Political Science* 53(2): 461-476.
- James Raymond Vreeland. 2008. "Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture." *International Organization* 62: 651-101.
- Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith. 2008. *Punishing the Prince: A Theory of Interstate Relations*. Princeton University Press.
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson, and James D. Morrow. 2003. *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

#### AGENDA-SETTING AND DELEGATION

**Week 12: November 14** — Setting the Agenda.

#### BACKGROUND READING:

McCarty and Meirowitz. 2007. *Political Game Theory*. Chapter 7 (Section 5) and Chapter 8 (Section 4).

#### REQUIRED READING:

Kenneth A. Shepsle. 2010. *Analyzing Politics*. Norton. Chapter 13.

Thomas Romer and Howard Rosenthal. 1978. "Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo". *Public Choice* 34: 2743.

Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2005. *Setting the Agenda*. Cambridge.

RECOMMENDED READING:

- Sarah A. Binder. 2006. "Parties and Institutional Choice Revisited." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 31(4): 513-532.
- Susan C. Stokes. 2005. "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina." *American Political Science Review* 99(3): 315-325.
- Kathleen Bawn. 1999. "Money and Majorities in the Federal Republic of Germany: Evidence for a Veto Players Model of Government Spending". *American Journal of Political Science* 43(3): 707-736.
- George Tsebelis and Amie Kreppel. 1998. "The History of Conditional Agenda-Setting in European Institutions." *European Journal of Political Research* 33(1): 41-71.
- Daniel Diermeier and Timothy J. Feddersen. 1998. "Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure". *American Political Science Review* 92(3): 611-621.
- John D. Huber. 1992. "Restrictive Legislative Procedures in France and the United States". *American Political Science Review* 86(3): 675-687.
- Thomas W. Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel. 1989. "Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a Heterogenous Committee". *American Journal of Political Science* 33(2): 459-490.
- Peter C. Ordeshook and Thomas R. Palfrey. 1988. "Agendas, Strategic Voting, and Signaling with Incomplete Information." *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 441-466

**Week 13: November 21** — Legislative Delegation and Electoral Control.

REQUIRED READING:

Kenneth A. Shepsle. 2010. *Analyzing Politics*. Norton. Chapter 13.

J. Bendor, A. Glazer, and T. Hammond. 2001. "Theories of delegation". *Annual Review of Political Science*. 4: 235.

Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols and Fire Alarms." *American Journal of Political Science* 28: 165-179.

Christine S. Lipsmeyer and Heather N. Pierce. 2011. "The Eyes that Bind: Junior Ministers as Oversight Mechanisms in Coalition Governments." *The Journal of Politics* 73(4): 1152-1164.

Ferejohn, John. 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control. *Public Choice* 50: 525.

RECOMMENDED READING:

- Kaare Strom, Wolfgang C. Muller, and Torbjorn Bergman (Editors). 2003. *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*. Oxford.

- Adam Przeworski. 2003. “Principal-Agent Framework” (Chapter 4), “Governments and Private Agents: Regulation” (Chapter 6), and “Citizens and Politicians: Representation” (Chapter 8) in *States and Markets: A Primer in Political Economy*. Cambridge. Pp. 55-75, 99-157.

**Week 14: December 5** — Executive Delegation.

REQUIRED READING:

John D. Huber and Charles R. Shipan. 2002. *Deliberate Discretion: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Miriam Golden. 2003. “Electoral Connections: The Effects of the Personal Vote on Political Patronage, Bureaucracy and Legislation in Postwar Italy.” *British Journal of Political Science* 33(2): 189-212.

David Siegel and Jacob N. Shapiro. 2012. “Moral Hazard, Discipline, and the Management of Terrorist Organizations.” *World Politics* 64 (1): 39-78.

RECOMMENDED READING:

- Kenneth A. Shepsle. 2010. *Analyzing Politics*. Norton. Chapter 15.
- Jacqueline H.R. Demeritt. Forthcoming. “Delegating Death: Military Intervention and Government Killing.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.
- Özge Kemahlioğlu. 2011. “Jobs in politicians’ backyards: party leadership competition and patronage.” *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 23(4): 480-509.
- Michael Colaresi and Sabine C. Carey. 2008. “To Kill or to Protect: Military Strength, Domestic Institutions, and Genocide.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52(1): 39-67.
- Christopher Reenock and Sarah Poggione. 2004. “Agency Design as an Ongoing Tool of Bureaucratic Influence”. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 29: 383-406.
- Adam Przeworski. 2003. “Politicians and bureaucrats: Oversight” (Chapter 7) in *States and Markets: A Primer in Political Economy*. Cambridge. Pp. 55-75, 99-157.
- Brandice Canes-Wrone. 2001. “A Theory of Presidents’ Public Agenda Setting.” *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 13(2): 183-208.

**Week 15: December 12** — Summary discussion.

**FINAL EXAM DUE TUESDAY, DECEMBER 17.**

## **Additional Information**

### **Academic Dishonesty**

The Department of Political Science, along with the College of the Liberal Arts and the University, takes violations of academic dishonesty seriously. Observing basic honesty in one's work, words, ideas, and actions is a principle to which all members of the community are required to subscribe.

All course work by students is to be done on an individual basis unless an instructor clearly states that an alternative is acceptable. Any reference materials used in the preparation of any assignment must be explicitly cited. Students uncertain about proper citation are responsible for checking with their instructor.

In an examination setting, unless the instructor gives explicit prior instructions to the contrary, whether the examination is in class or take home, violations of academic integrity shall consist but are not limited to any attempt to receive assistance from written or printed aids, or from any person or papers or electronic devices, or of any attempt to give assistance, whether the one so doing has completed his or her own work or not.

Lying to the instructor or purposely misleading any Penn State administrator shall also constitute a violation of academic integrity.

In cases of any violation of academic integrity it is the policy of the Department of Political Science to follow procedures established by the College of the Liberal Arts. More information on academic integrity and procedures followed for violation can be found at: [http://www.la.psu.edu/CLA-Academic\\_Integrity/integrity.shtml](http://www.la.psu.edu/CLA-Academic_Integrity/integrity.shtml)

### **Disabilities**

Penn State welcomes students with disabilities into the University's educational programs. If you have a disability-related need for reasonable academic adjustments in this course, contact the Office for Disability Services. For further information regarding policies, rights and responsibilities please visit the Office for Disability Services (ODS) Web site at: [www.equity.psu.edu/ods/](http://www.equity.psu.edu/ods/). Instructors should be notified as early in the semester as possible regarding the need for reasonable accommodations.

## PL SC 551 Political Institutions

Take-home examination.

Due on December 17, 2008 prior to 4:00 pm (in my mailbox).

### *Instructions.*

Your exam should be no longer than 12 single-spaced pages in total (not including the bibliography or cover page). It can be less. Use standard-size fonts and margins. Staple your exam in the top-left corner (no folders, fancy or otherwise), and put your name *only* on a cover page. There should be nothing on the rest of the pages that identifies you as the author in any way. This will allow me to grade the exams anonymously.

You should spend as much time/space on each part of the question as you think appropriate. I am not expecting that you will write an equal amount for each section (though, of course, you are free to do so). Incorporate the readings from the semester where relevant. You should feel free to lean more heavily on the readings most directly related to your current interests, though you are expected to incorporate other areas of the literature covered in class as well.

### *Question.*

Institutions can be solutions to political problems. For each of the main classes of political problems listed below, explain what the problem is, and what types of institutions might be solutions. How do such institutions solve these problems? (Do some actors benefit more than others? Which problems might these institutions *not* solve?) Draw examples from the readings as appropriate.

- Preference aggregation.
- Cooperation/coordination.
- Agenda setting.
- Delegation.