

PL SC 597B: EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS

Sona N. Golder

Course information:

Time: Monday 1:00 - 4:00, Pond Lab 236

Contact information for Professor:

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Office Hours: By appointment, or just stop by my office.

Course Description

This course focuses on the life cycle of government cabinets and how the organization and role of the executive is affected by its relationship with the legislature in parliamentary, semi-presidential, and presidential democracies. This literature is particularly well-developed for parliamentary democracies, and explores, for example, the factors that determine government stability and duration, which parties enter the cabinet and get ministerial portfolios, and whether different types of governments produce different policy outcomes. A smaller, but rapidly growing, literature looks at these types of questions in both semi-presidential and presidential regimes, and examines how the composition and behavior of the executive is affected by its relationship with the legislature. In addition to the work on government life cycles, we will address a related literature focusing on the relationship between domestic institutional arrangements and various kinds of democratic stability or economic outcomes. Variation in these domestic political arrangements also has implications for interactions between or among countries at the international level. Throughout the course, we will discuss the extent to which institutions, combined with the political context of different countries, produce outcomes (such as government or regime stability) that are of interest to political scientists.

Required Books:

- David Samuels and Matthew S. Shugart. 2010. *Presidents, parties, and prime ministers: How the separation of powers affects party organization and behavior*. Cambridge University Press.
- Irfan Nooruddin. 2011. *Coalition Politics and Economic Development: Credibility and the Strength of Weak Governments*. Cambridge.

In addition to the books listed above, we will read articles, book chapters, and unpublished manuscripts. Some additional 'recommended readings' are listed below each topic on the schedule. These are included as a preliminary (and non-exhaustive) guide for further reading.

Grading

Your final grade is a weighted average of the following components:

- Participation (50%).
 - All students are required to have completed the readings for each week before class begins, and *everyone* should be prepared to discuss the readings during class. I expect all students to provide evidence that they have done the readings in a thoughtful and careful manner. Not participating in class discussions, or participating but with a demonstrated inability to discuss the readings in detail, is an example of behavior that does not meet expectations and will be graded accordingly. You will also be called upon to offer feedback (written and oral) on the final papers of your colleagues at at least a couple of points throughout the semester.
- Final Paper (50%).
 - The course will require a final paper that must be related to some aspect of the material covered during the semester. I construe the subject matter rather broadly; that is, the final paper must address some feature of democratic executives, legislatures, or the relationship between these two. I expect that a wide range of projects would comfortably fit this description. I am open to the idea that this could be an extension of a previous paper, or could be part of a larger project related to your MA thesis or dissertation proposal. Note that if you intend to hand in the paper for this class as well as a separate class, you will need explicit permission from both professors.

SCHEDULE

January 13 – Introduction. Democratic regime types (presidential, parliamentary, semi-presidential).

Required Reading:

- ◇ Cheibub, José Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2010. “Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited”. *Public Choice* 143 (1-2):67-101.
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9491-2
- ◇ Golder, Sona N. “Government Formation and Cabinets”. Invited submission for *Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences* (Wiley).
- ◇ Clark, William, Matt Golder, & Sona N. Golder. 2012. *Principles of Comparative Politics*. Chapter 12. “Parliamentary, presidential, and semi-presidential democracies: Making and breaking governments”. Washington D.C.: CQ Press.
- ◇ Martínez-Gallardo, Cecilia. 2012. “Out of the Cabinet: What Drives Defections from the Government in Presidential Systems?” *Comparative Political Studies*, 45, 62-90.
DOI: 10.1177/0010414011421306

Recommended Reading:

- Bassi, Anna. 2013. "A Model of Endogenous Government Formation." *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 57(4), 777-793.
DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12031
- Matt Golder, Sona N. Golder and David Siegel. 2012. "Modeling the Institutional Foundations of Parliamentary Government Formation." *Journal of Politics*. 74(2): 1-19.
DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022381611001654>
- Garrett Glasgow, Matt Golder and Sona N. Golder. 2011. "Who 'Wins'? Determining the Party of the Prime Minister." *American Journal of Political Science*. 55(4): 937-54.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00524.x
- Laver, Michael, Scott De Marchi & Hande Mutlu. 2011. "Negotiation in Legislatures over Government Formation." *Public Choice*.
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9627-4
- Saeigh, Sebastian, Adam Przeworski and José Antonio Cheibub. 2004. "Government Coalitions and Legislative Success Under Presidentialism and Parliamentarism," *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 34, No. 4: 565-58.
DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007123404000195>
- Strøm, Kaare, Wolfgang C. Müller and Torbjörn Bergman (Eds.). 2008. *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*. Oxford University Press.
- Laver, Michael and Norman Schofield. 1998 [1990]. *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Strøm, Kaare, Ian Budge and Michael Laver. 1994. "Constraints on cabinet formation in parliamentary democracies." *American Journal of Political Science*. 38(2): 303-335.

January 20 – No class (Holiday in honor of Martin Luther King, Jr.).

January 27 – Forming Governments.

Required Reading:

- ◇ Mershon, Carol. 1994. "Expectations and Informal Rules in Coalition Formation." *Comparative Political Studies* 27: 40-79.
- ◇ Golder, Sona N. 2010. "Bargaining Delays in the Government Formation Process." *Comparative Political Studies* 43: 3-32.
- ◇ Schleiter, Petra and Edward Morgan-Jones. 2010. "Who's in Charge? Presidents, Assemblies, and the Political Control of Semipresidential Cabinets." *Comparative Political Studies* 43: 1415-1441.
- ◇ Kedar, Orit. 2012. "Voter Choice and Parliamentary Politics: An Emerging Research Agenda" *British Journal of Political Science* 42(3): 537-553.
- ◇ Hobolt, Sara B., James Tilley, and Susan A. Banducci. 2013. "Clarity of responsibility: How government cohesion conditions performance voting." *European Journal of Political Research* 52(2): 164-187.
- ◇ Indriðason, Indriði H. and Shaun Bowler. 2013. "Determinants of cabinet size". *European Jour-*

nal of Political Research.

Recommended Reading:

- Tavits, Margit. 2009. *Presidents with Prime Ministers*. Oxford University Press.
- Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha and Mandar Oak. 2008. "Coalition Governments in a Model of Parliamentary Democracy". *European Journal of Political Economy* 24(3): 554-56.
- Golder, Sona N. 2006. *The Logic of Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation*. Ohio State University Press.
- Warwick, Paul V. 2005. "Do Policy Horizons Structure the Formation of Parliamentary Governments?: The Evidence from an Expert Survey". *American Journal of Political Science* 49: 373-387.
- Laver, Michael and Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1999. "How Political Parties Emerged from the Primeval Slime: Party Cohesion, Party Discipline, and The Formation of Governments" in *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government*, Eds. Shaun Bowler, David M. Farrell, & Richard S. Katz. Columbus: Ohio State University Press. pp. 23 - 48.
- Laver, Michael & Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1996. *Making and Breaking Governments*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

February 3 – Paper proposal due.

February 10 – Cabinet Portfolios and Executive Appointments.

Required Reading:

- ◇ Warwick, Paul V. and James N. Druckman. 2006. "The portfolio allocation paradox: An investigation into the nature of a very strong but puzzling relationship." *European Journal of Political Research* 45: 635-665.
- ◇ Amorim Neto, Octavio and David Samuels. 2010. "Democratic Regimes and Cabinet Politics: A Global Perspective." *Revista Ibero-Americana de Estudos Legislativos* 1: 10-23.
- Lewis, David E. 2011. "Presidential Appointments and Personnel." *Annual Review of Political Science* 14: 47-66.
- ◇ Bäck, Hanna, Marc Debus and Patrick Dumont. 2011. "Who gets what in coalition governments? Predictors of portfolio allocation in parliamentary democracies." *European Journal of Political Research* 50(4): 441-478.
- ◇ Golder, Sona N. and Jacquelyn A. Thomas. 2014. "Portfolio Allocation and the Vote of No Confidence." *British Journal of Political Science* 44(1): 29-39.
- ◇ Arriola, Leonardo R. and Martha C. Johnson. Forthcoming. "Ethnic Politics and Women's Empowerment in Africa: Ministerial Appointments to Executive Cabinets." *American Journal of Political Science*.

Recommended Reading:

- Krook, Mona Lena and Diana Z. O'Brien. 2012. "All the President's Men? The Numbers and Portfolio Allocations of Female Cabinet Ministers." *Journal of Politics* 74(3): 840-855.
- Ono, Yoshikuni. 2012. "Portfolio Allocation as Leadership Strategy: Intraparty Bargaining in Japan." *American Journal of Political Science* 56(3): 553-567.
- Lipsmeyer, Christine S. and Heather N. Pierce. 2011. "The Eyes that Bind: Junior Ministers as Oversight Mechanisms in Coalition Governments." *The Journal of Politics* 73(4): 1152-1164.
- Schleiter, Petra and Edward Morgan-Jones. 2009. "Party government in Europe? Parliamentary and semi-

presidential democracies compared”. *European Journal of Political Research* 48: 665-693.

Amorim Neto, Octavio. 2006. “The Presidential Calculus: Executive Policy-Making and Cabinet Formation in the Americas.” *Comparative Political Studies* 39(4): 415-440.

Escobar-Lemmon, Maria and Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson. 2005. “Women Ministers in Latin American Government.” *American Journal of Political Science* 49(4): 829-44.

February 17 – Government Stability.

Required Reading:

◇ Boston, Jonathan, Stephen Levine, Elizabeth McLeay, Nigel S. Roberts and Hannah Schmidt. 1998. “Caretaker Government and the evolution of Caretaker Conventions in New Zealand” *Victoria University of Wellington Law Review* 30.

◇ Davis, Glyn, Alice Ling, Bill Scales and Roger Wilkins. 2001. “Rethinking Caretaker Conventions for Australian Governments”, *Australian Journal of Public Administration*: 60:11-26.

◇ Huber, John D. and Arthur Lupia. 2001. “Cabinet Instability and Delegation in Parliamentary Democracies”. *American Journal of Political Science* 45: 18-32.

◇ Huber, John D. & Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo. 2008. “Replacing Cabinet Ministers: Patterns of Ministerial Stability in Parliamentary Democracies.” *American Political Science Review* 102(1): 169-80.

◇ Conrad, Courtenay R. and Sona N. Golder. 2010. “Measuring Government Duration and Stability in Central Eastern European Democracies”. *European Journal of Political Research* 49: 119-150.

◇ Marsteintredet, Leiv. Forthcoming. “Explaining variation of executive instability in presidential regimes: Presidential interruptions in Latin America.” *International Political Science Review*.

Recommended Reading:

Quiroz Flores, Alejandro. 2009. “The Political Survival of Foreign Ministers.” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 5: 117-133.

Indriðason, Indriði H. and Christopher Kam. 2008. “Cabinet Reshuffles and Ministerial Drift.” *British Journal of Political Science* 38: 621-56.

Bawn, Kathleen. 1995. “Political Control versus Expertise: Congressional Choices about Administrative Procedures.” *American Political Science Review* 89(1): 62-73.

February 24 – Government Termination.

Required Reading:

◇ Lupia, Arthur and Kaare Strøm. 1995. “Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections.” *American Political Science Review* 89(3): 648-65.

◇ Mershon, Carol A. 1996. “The costs of coalition: coalition theories and Italian governments”. *American Political Science Review*. 90: 534-54.

◇ Laver, Michael. 2003. “Government Termination”. *Annual Review of Political Science* 6: 23-40.

◇ Bernhard, William and David Leblang. 2008. “Cabinet Collapses and Currency Crashes”. *Political Research Quarterly* 61: 517-531.

◇ Schleiter, Petra and Edward Morgan-Jones. 2009. "Constitutional Power and Competing Risks: Monarchs, Presidents, Prime Ministers, and the Termination of East and West European Cabinets". *American Political Science Review* 103: 496-512.

Recommended Reading:

Tavits, Margit. 2008. "The Role of Parties' Past Behavior in Coalition Formation." *American Political Science Review* 102(4): 495-507.

Smith, Alastair. 2004. *Election Timing*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Mershon, Carol. 2002. *The Costs of Coalition*. Stanford University Press.

Warwick, Paul V. 1994. *Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

King, Gary, James E. Alt, Nancy E. Burns & Michael Laver. 1990. "A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies". *American Journal of Political Science* 34: 846-871.

March 3 – Policy Outcomes (I).

Required Reading:

◇ Amorim Neto, Octavio, Gary Cox, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2003. "Agenda Power in Brazil's Camara dos Deputados, 1989-98." *World Politics* 55: 550-78.

◇ Herzog, Alexander. 2013. "Pivotal Politics and Public Policy in Cabinet Governments." Manuscript, London School of Economics.

◇ Somer-Topcu, Zeynep and Laron K. Williams. 2013. "Opposition party policy shifts in response to no-confidence motions." *European Journal of Political Research*.

◇ Bevan, Shaun. and William Jennings. 2014. "Representation, agendas and institutions." *European Journal of Political Research* 53: 37-56.

◇ Palanza, Valeria and Gisela Sin. 2014. "Veto Bargaining and the Legislative Process in Multi-party Presidential Systems." *Comparative Political Studies* 47(7).

Recommended Reading:

de Vries, Catherine E. and Nathalie Giger. 2014 "Holding governments accountable? Individual heterogeneity in performance voting." *European Journal of Political Research*.

Alexiadou, Despina. 2013. "In Search of Successful Reform: The Politics of Opposition and Consensus in OECD Parliamentary Democracies." *West European Politics* 36(4).

Bawn, Kathleen and Zeynep Somer-Topcu. 2012. "Government versus Opposition at the Polls: How Governing Status Affects the Impact of Policy Positions." *American Journal of Political Science* 56(2): 433-446.

Kittilson, Miki Caul and Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer. 2010. "Engaging Citizens: The Role of Power-Sharing Institutions." *Journal of Politics* 72(4): 990-1002.

Wiesehomeier, Nina and Kenneth Benoit. 2009. "Presidents, Parties and Policy Competition." *Journal of Politics* 71: 1435-1447.

**** Spring Break (No Class): March 10 - 14 ****

March 17 – Regime Type, Parties, and Mandates.

Required Reading:

- ◇ Samuels, David J. and Matthew S. Shugart. 2010. *Presidents, parties, and prime ministers: How the separation of powers affects party organization and behavior*. Cambridge University Press.
- ◇ Kellam, Marisa. Forthcoming. “Parties for Hire: How Particularistic Parties Influence Presidents’ Governing Strategies.” *Party Politics*. First published online June 7, 2013.

Recommended Reading:

- Mershon, Carol and Olga Shvetsova. Forthcoming. “Change in parliamentary party systems and policy outcomes: Hunting the core.” *Journal of Theoretical Politics*.
- Moury, Catherine. 2013. *Coalition Government and Party Mandate: How Coalition Agreements Constrain Ministerial Action*. Routledge.
- Kam, Christopher. 2009. *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Politics*. Cambridge University Press.

March 24 – Presentations/Reviews of Paper Drafts.

March 31 – Policy Outcomes (II).

Required Reading:

- ◇ Vreeland, James Raymond. 2002. “Institutional Determinants of IMF Agreements.” Unpublished manuscript.
- ◇ Hallerberg, Mark and Patrick Marier. 2004. “Executive authority, the personal vote, and budget discipline in Latin American and Caribbean countries.” *American Journal of Political Science* 48(3): 571-587.
- ◇ Bernhard, William and David Leblang 2006. *Pricing Politics: Democratic Processes and Financial Markets*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1 and 6.
- ◇ Indriðason, Indriði H. 2008. “Does Terrorism Influence Domestic Politics? Coalition Formation and Terrorist Incidents.” *Journal of Peace Research* 45(2): 241-260.
- ◇ Crisp, Brian F., Scott W. Desposato, and Kristin Kanthak. 2011. “Legislative Pivots, Presidential Powers, and Policy Stability.” *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 27(2): 426-452.

Recommended Reading:

- König, Thomas and Vera E. Troeger. 2005. “Budgetary Politics and Veto Players”. *Swiss Political Science Review* 11(4): 47-75.
- Samuels, David. 2004. “Presidentialism and Accountability for the Economy in Comparative Perspective.” *American Political Science Review* 98(3): 425-36.
- Bawn, Kathleen. 1999. “Money and Majorities in the Federal Republic of Germany: Evidence for a Veto Players Model of Government Spending”. *American Journal of Political Science* 43: 707-736.
- Anderson, Christopher J. 1995. “The Dynamics of Public Support for Coalition Governments.” *Comparative Political Studies* 28(3): 350-383.

April 7 – Decentralization/Federalism.

Required Reading:

- ◇ Kedar, Orit. 2006. “How Voters Work around Institutions: Policy Balancing in Staggered Elections.” *Electoral Studies*. 25(3): 509-527.
- ◇ Hobolt, Sara Binzer, and Robert Klemmensen. 2008. “Government Responsiveness and Political Competition in Comparative Perspective.” *Comparative Political Studies* 41(3): 309-37.
- ◇ Bednar, Jenna. 2011. “The Political Science of Federalism.” *Annual Review of Law and Social Science*, Volume 7(1):269-288.
- ◇ Escobar-Lemmon, Maria and Ashley D. Ross. 2014. “Does Decentralization Improve Perceptions of Accountability? Attitudinal Evidence from Colombia.” *American Journal of Political Science*, 58: 175-188.
- ◇ Bäck, Hanna, Marc Debus and Heike Klüver. 2014. “Federalism, Bicameralism and the Formation of Party Policy Positions.” Unpublished Manuscript.

Recommended Reading:

- West, Karleen Jones and Jae-Jae Spoon. 2013. “Credibility vs Competition: The Impact of Party Size on Decisions to Enter Presidential Elections in South America and Europe.” *Comparative Political Studies* 46(4): 513-539.
- Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca. 2012. “What Wins Votes: Why Some Politicians Opt Out of Clientelism.” *American Journal of Political Science* 56(3): 568-83.
- Tavits, Margit. 2009. “Geographically Targeted Spending: Exploring the Electoral Strategies of Incumbent Governments.” *European Political Science Review*, 1(1): 103-123.
- Stefuriuc, Irina. 2009. “Government Formation in Multi-Level Settings: Spanish Regional Coalitions and the Quest for Vertical Congruence.” *Party Politics* 15: 93-115.
- Bäck, Hanna. 2008. “Intraparty Politics and Coalition Formation: Evidence from Swedish Local Government”. *Party Politics* 14: 71-89.
- Escobar-Lemmon, Maria. 2006. “Executives, Legislatures, and Decentralization.” *Policy Studies Journal* 34 (2): 245-263.

April 14 – Coalitions and Economic Policy.

Required Reading:

- ◇ Nooruddin, Irfan. 2011. *Coalition Politics and Economic Development: Credibility and the Strength of Weak Governments*. Cambridge University Press.
- ◇ Arriola, Leonardo R. 2013. “Capital and Opposition in Africa: Coalition Building in Multiethnic Societies.” *World Politics* 65(2): 233-272.

Recommended Reading:

- Kemahlioğlu, Özge. 2008. “Particularistic Distribution of Investment Subsidies under Coalition Governments: The Case of Turkey.” *Comparative Politics* 40(2): 189-207.
- Bawn, Kathleen and Frances Rosenbluth. 2006. “Short versus Long Coalitions: Electoral Accountability

and the Size of the Public Sector.” *American Journal of Political Science* 50(2): 251-65.

Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini. 2005. *The Economic Effects of Constitutions*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Hallerberg, Mark. 2004. *Domestic Budgets in a United Europe*. Cornell University Press.

McGillivray, Fiona. 2004. *Privileging Industry: The Comparative Politics of Trade and Industrial Policy*. Princeton University Press.

Lohmann, Susanne and Sharon O’Halloran. 1994. “Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Theory and Evidence.” *International Organization* 48(4): 595-632.

Blais, André, Donald Blake and Stéphane Dion. 1993. “Do Parties Make a Difference? Parties and the Size of Government in Liberal Democracies”. *American Journal of Political Science* 37: 40-62.

April 21 – Regime Type and Democratic Stability.

Required Reading:

- ◇ Tsebelis, George. 1995. “Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism.” *British Journal of Political Science* 25(3): 289-325.
- ◇ Cheibub, José Antonio and Fernando Limongi. 2002. “Democratic Institutions and Regime Survival: Parliamentarism and Presidentialism Reconsidered.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 5: 151-179.
- ◇ Cheibub, José Antonio and Svitlana Chernykh. 2009. “Are Semi-presidential Constitutions Bad for Democracy?” *Constitutional Political Economy* 20(3-4): 202-229.
- ◇ Cheibub, José Antonio, Zachary Elkins, and Tom Ginsburg. 2014. “Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism.” *British Journal of Political Science*.

Recommended Reading:

- Perez-Liñan, Anibal. 2010. *Presidential Impeachment and the New Political Instability in Latin America* Cambridge University Press.
- Hellwig, Timothy and David Samuels. 2008. “Electoral Accountability and the Variety of Democratic Regimes.” *British Journal of Political Science* 38: 65-90.
- Yap, O. Fiona. 2008. “Executive-Legislature Divide and Party Volatility in Emergent Democracies: Lessons for Democratic Performance from Taiwan.” *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 9(3): 305-322.
- Aleman, Eduardo and Thomas Schwartz. 2006. “Presidential Vetoes in Latin American Constitutions.” *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 18(1): 98-120.
- Metcalf, Lee Kendall. 2000. “Measuring Presidential Power.” *Comparative Political Studies* 33(5): 660-685.
- MainwaringScott. 1993. “Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination.” *Comparative Political Studies* 26 (2): 198-228.
- Laver, Michael and Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1991. “Divided Government: America is not ‘Exceptional’.” *Governance* 4(3): 250-269.

April 28 – Presentations of Final Projects.

PAPER DUE TUESDAY, MAY 6.

Additional Information

Academic Dishonesty

The Department of Political Science, along with the College of the Liberal Arts and the University, takes violations of academic dishonesty seriously. Observing basic honesty in one's work, words, ideas, and actions is a principle to which all members of the community are required to subscribe.

All course work by students is to be done on an individual basis unless an instructor clearly states that an alternative is acceptable. Any reference materials used in the preparation of any assignment must be explicitly cited. Students uncertain about proper citation are responsible for checking with their instructor.

In an examination setting, unless the instructor gives explicit prior instructions to the contrary, whether the examination is in class or take home, violations of academic integrity shall consist but are not limited to any attempt to receive assistance from written or printed aids, or from any person or papers or electronic devices, or of any attempt to give assistance, whether the one so doing has completed his or her own work or not.

Lying to the instructor or purposely misleading any Penn State administrator shall also constitute a violation of academic integrity.

In cases of any violation of academic integrity it is the policy of the Department of Political Science to follow procedures established by the College of the Liberal Arts. More information on academic integrity and procedures followed for violation can be found at: http://www.la.psu.edu/CLA-Academic_Integrity/integrity.shtml

Disabilities

Penn State welcomes students with disabilities into the University's educational programs. If you have a disability-related need for reasonable academic adjustments in this course, contact the Office for Disability Services. For further information regarding policies, rights and responsibilities please visit the Office for Disability Services (ODS) Web site at: www.equity.psu.edu/ods/. Instructors should be notified as early in the semester as possible regarding the need for reasonable accommodations.