Parliaments and Legislatures
Janet M. Box-Steppensmeier and David T. Canon, Series Editors
To my parents,

Jim and Nancy Nadenichek
CONTENTS

List of Illustrations ix
Preface xi
Acknowledgments xiii

Chapter 1 Introduction 1
Chapter 2 Identifying Electoral Coalitions 11
Chapter 3 Existing Theories 23
Chapter 4 A Theoretical Model 38
Chapter 5 France and South Korea 55
Chapter 6 Empirical Implications: Testing the Theoretical Model 84
Chapter 7 Pre-Electoral Agreements and Government Coalitions 103
Chapter 8 Conclusion 137

Appendix 147
Notes 171
References 183
Author Index 201
Subject Index 205
# ILLUSTRATIONS

## Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Disproportionality Hypothesis</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Timeline of Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation Game</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Electoral Thresholds and Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Party-System Polarization and Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>Coalition Asymmetry and Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>Expected Coalition Size and Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>Disproportionality Hypothesis Revisited</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>Pre-Electoral Coalitions and Duration of Government Formation</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Descriptive Data about Pre-Electoral Coalitions by Country</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Pre-Electoral Coalitions by Electoral Formula</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Descriptive Statistics for Pre-Electoral Coalitions</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>Regression Results: Disproportionality vs. Signaling Hypotheses</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Actors, Actions, and Payoffs in Bargaining Game</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Comparative Statics from Bargaining Game</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Electoral Coalitions in French Legislative and Presidential Elections</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Electoral Thresholds and Second-Round Candidates in France</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Predicted Effect of Variables</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Regression Results: Probability of Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>Substantive Effect of Explanatory Variables</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>Regression Results: Disproportionality Hypothesis Revisited</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>Regression Results: Identity of Government Coalitions</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>Descriptive Data on Duration of Government Formation Process</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>Regression Results: Duration of Government Formation Process</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>Pre-Electoral Coalitions and Ideological Compatibility</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>Regression Results: Government Duration</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.1</td>
<td>Electoral Coalitions in Australia, 1946–2002</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.2</td>
<td>Electoral Coalitions in Austria, 1946–2002</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.3</td>
<td>Electoral Coalitions in Belgium, 1946–2002</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.4</td>
<td>Electoral Coalitions in Denmark, 1946–2002</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.5</td>
<td>Electoral Coalitions in Finland, 1946–2002</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.7</td>
<td>Electoral Coalitions in Germany, 1946–2002</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.9</td>
<td>Electoral Coalitions in Iceland, 1946–2002</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.10</td>
<td>Electoral Coalitions in Ireland, 1946–2002</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.11</td>
<td>Electoral Coalitions in Israel, 1948–2002</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.12</td>
<td>Electoral Coalitions in Italy, 1946–2002</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.13</td>
<td>Electoral Coalitions in Japan, 1946–2002</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.14</td>
<td>Electoral Coalitions in Luxembourg, 1946–2002</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.15</td>
<td>Electoral Coalitions in the Netherlands, 1946–2002</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.16</td>
<td>Electoral Coalitions in New Zealand, 1946–2002</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.17</td>
<td>Electoral Coalitions in Norway, 1946–2002</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.19</td>
<td>Electoral Coalitions in Spain, 1977–2002</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.20</td>
<td>Electoral Coalitions in Sweden, 1946–2002</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.21</td>
<td>Electoral Coalitions in the United Kingdom, 1946–2002</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PREFACE

In this book, I investigate the conditions under which pre-electoral coalitions form. In most democracies, political parties who wish to exercise executive power are typically forced to enter some form of coalition. In effect, they can either form a pre-electoral coalition with another party (or parties) prior to election in the hopes of governing together afterward if successful at the polls, or they can compete independently and hope to form a government coalition after the election. The fact that coalition government is the norm rather than the exception across the world has encouraged a vast coalition literature to develop in political science. The overwhelming majority of this literature focuses purely on government coalitions. By contrast, electoral coalitions are virtually ignored. This lack of literature is surprising, given that pre-electoral coalitions are common, that they affect election outcomes, and that they have important policy and normative implications. I redress this imbalance in our knowledge of coalitions by focusing on pre-electoral coalitions in this book. I use a combination of methodological approaches (game theoretic, qualitative, and quantitative) to explain why pre-electoral coalitions form in some circumstances, but not in others.

I argue that there is a common underlying logic to the formation of pre-electoral coalitions that can be captured in a simple bargaining model between party leaders who care about office and policy. Using a two-stage bargaining game, I derive several hypotheses relating the likelihood of pre-electoral coalition formation to institutional and ideological features of the party system. I use in-depth qualitative analyses of electoral coalition history in France and in South Korea to provide support for the model’s assumptions and hypotheses. I also subject the hypotheses to a more systematic statistical analysis using a new data set on pre-electoral coalitions in advanced industrialized democracies. I find that pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form between ideologically compatible parties. They are also more likely to form when the expected coalition size is large (but not too large) and when the potential coalition partners are similar in size. They are also more likely to form if the party system is ideologically polarized and the electoral rules are disproportional.

Although party leaders often form electoral coalitions to win more votes and seats, the effects of pre-electoral coalitions do not end once the votes have been counted and legislative seats have been allocated. After presenting my explanation
of pre-electoral coalition formation, I begin to link my analysis to the larger government coalition literature by showing how pre-electoral agreements affect several aspects of government coalitions in advanced industrialized democracies. I find that pre-electoral agreements increase the likelihood that a party will enter into government, they increase the ideological compatibility of governments, and they increase the speed with which governments take office.

In addition to these generally positive consequences, I argue throughout the book that pre-electoral coalitions provide an opportunity for combining the best elements of the majoritarian vision of democracy (increased accountability, transparency, government identifiability, and mandates) with the best elements of the proportional vision of democracy (wide choice, more accurate reflection of voter preferences in both the legislature and government). If this is a desirable goal, as I believe it should be, then the analyses conducted in this book show that political actors can encourage pre-electoral coalition formation by manipulating the electoral rules. As I clearly indicate, though, the actual effect of this manipulation will depend on the size of the party system and the ideological nature of political competition in each country.

I maintain a website for this book. On the website you will find a detailed codebook, as well as all the data and computer code necessary to replicate the results and figures in this book. The current URL is http://www.fsu.edu/~polisci/people/faculty/sgolder.htm. Please contact me if you have any comments, questions, or quibbles concerning the data or any of the analyses. It is my hope that other scholars will pursue the study of pre-electoral coalitions and improve our knowledge beyond what I have provided in this preliminary study—the study of electoral coalitions provides a fertile terrain for the opportunistic researcher.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am grateful to the many people who contributed time, energy, and constructive criticism to this book. The Politics Department at NYU provided a challenging and supportive graduate work environment and I cannot possibly speak highly enough of my experience there. If I had not been fortunate enough to work with Bill Clark, Mike Gilligan, Jonathan Nagler, Bing Powell, and Alastair Smith on the first stage of this project, I would have written an entirely different—and markedly inferior—book. Constant interactions over several years with Bill Clark made me a better social scientist, and the book reflects this in ways that are too numerous to itemize here. Jonathan Nagler’s patience with questions and multiple drafts of every part of the book is also much appreciated; certainly the analysis, as well as its presentation, would be much less clear and informative without his countless suggestions on matters both large and small. I am lucky to have benefited as well from Bing Powell’s enthusiasm, his knowledge of pre-electoral coalitions, and his willingness to serve on a dissertation committee outside his own university.

In addition to the members of my dissertation committee mentioned above, I owe a debt of gratitude to many scholars who provided feedback, data, or other useful information at various stages of this project. I thank John Aldrich, Neal Beck, Torbjörn Bergman, Steve Brams, Fred Boehmke, Jamie Druckman, Mark Hallerberg, Anna Harvey, Indriði Indriðason, Chris Kam, Marek Kaminski, Wonik Kim, Skip Lupia, Bernard Manin, Becky Morton, Adam Przeworski, Marty Schain, Chuck Shipan, Jeff Staton, and Paul Warwick. The anonymous reviewers of this book manuscript were unusually constructive in their criticisms and I thank them for the effort they put into improving the book. Malcolm Litchfield at The Ohio State University Press has been encouraging and enthusiastic throughout all of our interactions, including after finding out that I was expecting a baby a month before the final manuscript was due. I am grateful to Michael Lewis-Beck for providing me with a visiting position at the University of Iowa, which allowed me to spend the 2004–5 academic year revising this book and enjoying the collegial working environment in the Iowa political science department; I thank Fred Boehmke, Sara Mitchell, and Chuck Shipan for being especially welcoming. Parts of the analysis in chapter 3 are based on a similar study published in *Electoral Studies* (2005) under the title “Pre-Electoral Coalitions in Comparative Perspective: A Test of Existing Hypotheses.” I thank Elsevier for
permission to reprint the material here. Part of the analysis in chapter 6 was published in the *British Journal of Political Science* (2006) under the title “Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation in Parliamentary Democracies.” I thank Cambridge University Press for permission to reprint this material.

The initial puzzle that sparked this entire project was based on my experiences as an intern in the French National Assembly during the 1995 presidential campaign. I was curious about the relationship between the two mainstream Right parties after seeing that both were internally divided over which of the two mainstream Right presidential candidates to support. The odd thing was that the two candidates proposed by the mainstream Right were from the same party, and the choice of which one to support seemed to be unrelated to party affiliation or policy. In fact, I was unable to find anyone at the National Assembly who could explain what the policy differences between the two parties were. Partway through graduate school I returned to this puzzle, wondering why the parties remained separate when their policy agendas were so similar and when their failures to coordinate could sometimes have disastrous electoral consequences. Around this time, I ran into my undergraduate thesis advisor, Daniel Verdier, at an APSA meeting. After I attempted to explain my inchoate dissertation idea to him, he immediately restated the question in terms of why parties form electoral coalitions. His reframing of my project was much more elegant than anything I was able to articulate at the time, and it gave me a clearer idea of how to proceed. It certainly wasn’t the first time he had clarified my muddled ideas. Indeed, his willingness to provide round after round of criticisms of my undergraduate thesis—thereby improving it beyond all recognition—had an enormous influence on my decision to go to graduate school in political science.

I should mention two other teachers who played a significant role in my intellectual development. John Thompson was my biology teacher during my freshman year in high school and steered me toward the Illinois Mathematics and Science Academy, a new school then being set up by the state of Illinois. At IMSA I acquired a good background in math and science, which has been extremely important for my training as a political scientist. While at IMSA I also had the good fortune to meet Elia Lopez, who taught me French. The background in math, science, and foreign language that I received at IMSA set the stage for productive college and graduate studies. The influence of both John and Elia (whom I now consider to be family) goes beyond the disciplines they initially taught; both are outstanding teachers and I hope that some of their enthusiasm and technique is reflected in my own teaching.

I have saved my most important debts for last. I rely on the constant support and encouragement from my wonderful family: my parents, my brother Jon, my sister-in-law Rosanne, my ‘new’ English family, and my irresistibly adorable
nephews Edward and Joseph. Of course, I owe the largest debt of gratitude to my best friend and husband Matt Golder, who has influenced every part of this book. He has always been willing to debate ideas and read multiple drafts of everything I write. I am especially grateful for his help with the final revisions of the book manuscript, completed under two rather pressing deadlines, one imposed by the editor and the other by the impending birth of our son Sean.
CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Prior to the 2002 German legislative election, the Social Democrats and the Greens reached a pre-electoral agreement announcing that they intended to form a government together if they received sufficient votes at the polls and encouraged voters to support their coalition. In the French legislative elections a few months earlier, the major parties on both the left and right were largely successful in forming pre-electoral coalitions of their own. Doing so typically meant fielding single candidates from the left or right in each electoral district. Yet in the French presidential elections that same year, the absence of pre-electoral agreements on the left and on the right allowed an extreme-right candidate, Jean-Marie Le Pen, into the final round of the presidential elections, an event the world press described as “a political earthquake.” Meanwhile, in the Dutch legislative elections, all of the political parties ran independent electoral campaigns, and there was a great deal of uncertainty as to the likely identity of the future coalition government up to and immediately following the legislative elections. These empirical observations raise the question as to why pre-electoral coalitions formed in Germany but not in the Netherlands, and why they formed in some French elections but not others. More generally, why do some parties coordinate their electoral strategies as part of a pre-electoral coalition, whereas others choose to compete independently at election time?

In most democracies, single parties are unable to command a majority of support in the legislature. Thus, political parties who wish to exercise executive power are typically forced to enter some form of coalition. In effect, they can either form an electoral coalition with another party (or parties) prior to an election, or they can compete independently at election time and form a government coalition afterwards. For the purposes of this study, ‘electoral’ or ‘pre-electoral’ coalitions are defined fairly broadly to include cases where party leaders announce to the electorate that they plan to form a government together if successful at the polls or if they agree to run under a single name with joint lists or nomination agreements.¹
The common link between these situations is that parties or party leaders in a pre-electoral coalition never compete in elections as truly independent entities. The fact that coalition government is the norm rather than the exception across the world has encouraged a vast literature to develop in political science. The overwhelming majority of this theoretical and empirical literature focuses purely on government coalitions; electoral coalitions are virtually ignored. This book seeks to redress this imbalance in our knowledge of coalitions by focusing on pre-electoral coalitions; specifically, it aims to explain electoral coalition formation at the national level. Although parties may form pre-electoral coalitions for several reasons, the theoretical and empirical analyses conducted in this book focus primarily on electoral coalitions between parties whose goal is to enter government. By concentrating on national-level efforts to enter government, my analyses of pre-electoral coalition formation can be directly connected with the existing government coalition literature.

Understanding the formation of electoral coalitions is important because (i) they can have a considerable impact on election outcomes, government composition, and policies; (ii) they have important normative implications for the representative nature of government; and (iii) they are quite common. Consider the following simple example. Imagine a legislative election with single-member districts in which there are two blocs of parties, one on the left and one on the right. The right-wing bloc has more electoral support than the Left. Suppose the parties on the left form an electoral coalition and field a common candidate in each district, but the parties on the right compete independently. The Right would most likely lose in this situation. In this example, the possibility arises that a majority of voters could vote for a group of politicians who support similar policies and that these politicians might still lose the election by failing to coordinate sufficiently. The result is that the left-wing party is elected to implement policies that a majority of the voters do not want. In other words, the absence of a pre-electoral coalition on the right can have a significant impact on the election outcome, on the government that forms, and on the policies that are likely to be implemented. Inasmuch as one places a normative value on the basic principle that the candidate with the most support among the electorate should be elected and should implement policy, it matters whether political elites choose electoral strategies and coalitions that make them more or less likely to win elections.

Coalition strategies employed by political parties also have important normative implications for the representative nature of governments. Powell (2000) distinguishes between majoritarian and proportional representation visions of democratic government. In the majoritarian vision, a party with a majority or plurality of the vote wins the election and governs the country until the next election. In this situation, members of the electorate know that their votes directly influence
which party exerts executive power and implements policy. In the proportional representation vision, this is not necessarily the case, since coalition governments often form after the votes have been counted, beyond the scrutiny of the electorate. In effect, elections in proportional systems “serve primarily as devices for electing representative agents in postelection bargaining processes, rather than as devices for choosing a specific executive” (Huber 1996, 185). As a result, the lines of accountability are blurred, and it is unclear how well voter preferences are reflected in the government that is ultimately formed.

To some extent, pre-electoral coalitions can alleviate this problem by helping voters to identify government alternatives and to register their support for one of them. In fact, party leaders in the Netherlands, Ireland, and Germany have made this type of argument publicly in order to explain their participation in electoral coalitions and in an attempt to appeal to voters (Saalfeld 2000; Mitchell 1999; Klingemann, Hofferbert, & Budge 1994; De Jong & Pijnenburg 1986). Arguably, electoral coalitions increase democratic transparency and provide coalition governments with as much of a mandate as single parties in majoritarian systems. In fact, one might even say that pre-electoral coalitions provide an opportunity for combining the best elements of the majoritarian vision of democracy (increased accountability, transparency, government identifiability, strong mandates) with the best elements of the proportional representation vision of democracy (wide choice, more accurate reflection of voter preferences in the legislature). Given the important implications for the representative nature of government, one might want to know the conditions under which pre-electoral coalitions form.

Finally, electoral coalitions are not rare phenomena. There were 240 pre-electoral coalitions between 1946 and 2002 in the 23 advanced industrialized parliamentary democracies at the center of this book. Significantly, 70 (29.2%) of these 240 pre-electoral coalitions actually went on to form the government following the election. This number would be even higher if I also counted governments that contained electoral coalitions along with additional government partners. One hundred seventy-four (47.8%) of the 364 legislative elections between 1946 and 2002 had at least one pre-electoral coalition. Thus, about one-fifth (19.2%) of all the elections examined in this book produced a government that was based on a pre-electoral agreement. Again, this number would be even higher if I counted governments that comprised an electoral coalition along with other parties. A recent study of formal government coalition agreements in Western European parliamentary democracies concluded that when all coalition cabinets were considered, many had an “identifiable coalition agreement,” and more than one-third were written prior to the election (Strøm & Müller 2000). Naturally, this study did not pick up all instances of electoral coalitions—it obviously omits all electoral coalitions that did not make it into government. However, it does serve to reinforce
the point that coalition bargaining often occurs prior to elections in a wide range of countries and that a large proportion of government coalitions are based on pre-electoral agreements. The strong empirical link found between pre-electoral and government coalitions suggests that if we think that understanding government coalitions is important, which the vast literature on this subject suggests is the case, then it must logically follow that understanding pre-electoral coalitions is important, as well.

Despite these strong reasons for studying electoral coalitions, current research has almost nothing to say about them. Those quantitative analyses and formal models of coalition behavior that exist are typically used to predict which government coalition will form (Baron & Ferejohn 1989; Laver & Shepsle 1990; Austen-Smith & Banks 1990; Baron 1991; Strøm, Budge, & Laver 1994; Diermeier & Merlo 2004), who gets which portfolio (Warwick & Druckman 2001), how long the formation process takes (Diermeier & van Roozendaal 1998; Martin & Vanberg 2003), and how long the government coalition will last (King et al. 1990; Warwick 1994; Lupia & Strøm 1995; Merlo 1997; Warwick 1999; Diermeier & Stevenson 1999; Diermeier, Eraslan, & Merlo 2003). In other words, they focus almost entirely on government coalitions. There are simply no formal models of government coalitions that incorporate the possibility of electoral coalitions. Pre-electoral coalitions are almost entirely absent in the quantitative literature, as well. Only in the case study literature do references to pre-electoral coalitions crop up with any semblance of regularity. Even among those scholars who address electoral coalitions here, the primary interest is not in studying the pre-election stage of electoral competition as such; electoral coalitions are typically treated purely as an interesting aside (Strøm, Budge, & Laver 1994; Laver & Schofield 1998; Müller & Strøm 2000; Müller & Müller 2000). To this point, there has been no systematic, cross-national research focused on electoral coalitions.

Given the prevalence of electoral coalitions and their potential normative and policy implications, I believe that this lack of focused research represents a serious omission in our knowledge of coalitions. In fact, this state of affairs has led G. Bingham Powell to claim in the conclusion to his highly influential book, *Elections as Instruments of Democracy*, that

One area that cries out for more serious theoretical and empirical work is the appearance of announced pre-electoral coalitions between political parties. We know too little about the origins of such coalitions and about the great variety of forms (shared manifestos, withdrawal of coalition partners, recommendations to voters) that they can take. But in a number of countries such coalitions unmistakably play a critical role at both electoral and legislative levels. (Powell 2000, 247)
My book begins to answer Powell’s appeal by examining the conditions under which electoral coalitions form.

This research objective presupposes the existence of a common underlying logic to the formation of pre-electoral coalitions. To some extent, this objective represents a new approach to analyzing these coalitions. As I mentioned earlier, the limited research that already exists on electoral coalitions is often country or election specific. One consequence of this fact is the emphasis placed on factors that are idiosyncratic to particular countries, elections, or party leaders. For example, the inability of the moderate right in France to form electoral coalitions in certain elections has frequently been explained in terms of the personal animosities or plain “stupidity” of party leaders (Bell 2000; Goldey 1999; Knapp 1999; Nay 1994). While the country-specific research is both important and highly informative, it does not offer us a general theory for explaining why electoral coalitions form in some circumstances but not in others. I seek to provide such a theory here.

As with government coalition formation, the emergence of pre-electoral coalitions is the result of a bargaining process among party leaders. For example, party leaders who wish to form a pre-electoral coalition must reach agreement over a joint electoral strategy and the distribution of office benefits that might accrue to them. This process may involve outlining a common coalition platform; deciding which party gets to run the more powerful ministerial posts; choosing which party’s candidates should step down in favor of candidates from their coalition partner(s) in particular districts; or determining which leader is to become prime minister. Clearly, any pre-electoral coalition bargaining process involves a thorny set of distributional and ideological issues. Ultimately, party leaders must weigh the incentives to form an electoral coalition against the incentives to run independently.

Before elaborating on these incentives, it is worth noting that the pre-electoral coalition formation process is not quite the same as the government coalition formation process. First, electoral advantages that come from competing together as a coalition, particularly in countries with disproportional electoral rules, will create incentives to form an electoral coalition that are no longer relevant in the post-election context. Put differently, forming a government coalition cannot influence the probability of electoral victory; electoral coalitions can. Second, the ideological compatibility constraint facing potential coalitions is likely to be stronger prior to the election than afterwards. This likelihood is because voters might be unwilling to vote for electoral coalitions comprising parties with incompatible policy preferences; after the election, parties have more leeway to enter into these types of government coalitions, because voters are no longer such an immediate constraint on politicians’ actions. My point here is only that it would be a mistake to immediately assume that the factors that have been found to be
important in the government coalition bargaining process will turn out to be the same factors that shape pre-electoral coalition formation.

The logic of electoral coalition formation that I present is based on the belief that party leaders care about winning office and policy (Müller & Strøm 1999). Party leaders must compare the utility that they expect to receive if they competed independently to the utility that they expect to receive if they competed as part of an electoral coalition. Consider first the case where party $i$ decides to run independently. In this scenario, the party may be sufficiently successful at the polls that it gets to enter government. If the party wins more than 50% of the seats, it could form a government on its own. In this situation, the party would obtain all of the office benefits associated with being in power and could set policy at its own ideal point. Clearly, this would be the first choice for party $i$. However, party $i$ will recognize that it is relatively rare for a single party to control a majority of the seats in most parliamentary systems. If party $i$ is to enter government, then it is much more likely to do so as part of a government coalition. In this case, party $i$ would receive some utility from its share of the office benefits and would suffer some utility loss from having government policy set at the ideal point of the coalition rather than at its own ideal point. Naturally, the utility loss suffered by each coalition partner would be lower the more ideologically compatible the government coalition. Finally, party $i$ will know that there is some probability that it will not get to enter government if it runs independently. If this situation arises, then it will receive no office benefits and will suffer the utility loss associated with having the government set policy at the government ideal point and not at party $i$’s ideal point. The lowest possible utility for party $i$ from running independently would occur if it was in opposition and government policy was ideologically distant from its own ideal point.

The second case is when party $i$ decides to run as part of an electoral coalition. Note that in order to form a pre-electoral coalition, it is likely that party $i$ will need to make some concessions in terms of policy and office to its potential coalition partners. For example, it is highly unlikely that party $i$ would get to set the coalition policy exactly at its own ideal point and/or obtain all of the office benefits if the electoral coalition entered government. These concessions are essentially the exact same concessions that parties that run independently would have to make when forming a government coalition after the election. Arguably, these concessions may be more costly to make prior to an election than afterwards. This possibility is because any concessions that must be made to other parties in terms of ministerial posts or coalition policies after an election can more easily be presented to party members as a consequence of the votes cast by the electorate; if the concessions occur before an election, they can only be blamed on the party leadership. Given this idea, one might reasonably wonder why parties do not simply
wait until after the election to make these concessions. Indeed, in many elections, this is precisely what happens.

However, the key thing to note about pre-electoral coalitions is that they can affect the probability that a party gets to enter government. Recognizing this fact, party leaders will form a pre-electoral coalition if they think that doing so will increase their probability of entering government to such an extent that the expected utility from forming such a coalition is larger than the expected utility from running independently. There are several reasons why pre-electoral coalitions might be electorally advantageous. First, it may be the case that an electoral coalition would attract a higher number of votes or seats than the coalition parties would jointly win running independently. This situation might occur if voters are risk averse in regard to the policy positions of potential future governments; that is, they prefer being able to identify a government alternative to being faced with a lottery over possible government outcomes, even if the mean expected policy position in both cases is identical. The lottery over possible government outcomes is less desirable, because the variance in possible policy positions is greater (Enelow & Hinich 1981; Snyder & Ting 2002; Ashworth & Bueno de Mesquita 2006). By decreasing voter uncertainty over which government coalition might form and thus which policy would get implemented, the parties that form a pre-electoral coalition might attract more votes than would otherwise be the case.

Second, and probably more important, is the strong empirical evidence that disproportional electoral institutions provide an electoral bonus to large parties or coalitions through their mechanical effect on the translation of votes into seats (Duverger 1963 [1954]; Lijphart 1994; Cox 1997; Clark & Golder 2006). Since all electoral systems are disproportional to some extent, electoral coalitions may hold out significant advantages in terms of extra legislative seats. Although we do not yet have an entirely satisfactory model of how particular distributions of legislative seats get translated into government coalitions, it seems reasonable to think that these extra legislative seats will be positively correlated with an increased probability of being in government. If this is the case, then party leaders will have an incentive to form pre-electoral coalitions.

To sum up, I hope to generate a wider scholarly debate about the role played by electoral coalitions at election time. Pre-electoral coalitions are important. Not only are they commonplace, but they also have the ability to determine electoral and policy outcomes. They may even be preferable on normative grounds to government coalitions that are not based on an electoral agreement. As a result, they deserve more attention from researchers. In the chapters that follow, I develop a theoretical model of electoral coalition formation and expose the hypotheses that it generates to statistical and case study analyses. In an attempt to link these analyses with the existing coalition literature, I also begin to examine how the decision
to form an electoral coalition affects various characteristics of government coalitions. This research represents the first attempt to formally analyze those factors that systematically influence the emergence of pre-electoral coalitions across elections and countries. The empirical analysis also represents the first time that data on electoral coalitions across such a large number of countries have been collected and analyzed.

The book proceeds in the following way. In the next chapter, I discuss in more detail how I define and identify pre-electoral coalitions. In addition to stating my coding rules and addressing several ambiguous cases, I also describe some of the different forms that electoral coalitions take in various countries and briefly summarize the data used in the rest of the book. In chapter three, I examine two hypotheses that are implicitly made in the existing coalition literature regarding pre-electoral coalitions. The first states that pre-electoral coalitions should be more common in disproportional electoral systems (Disproportionality Hypothesis). The second hypothesis focuses on the electorate’s desire to be able to identify future governments (Signaling Hypothesis). I test these hypotheses using data on pre-electoral coalitions in 23 advanced industrialized parliamentary democracies between 1946 and 2002. The data support a modified version of the Disproportionality Hypothesis—disproportional electoral rules do encourage pre-electoral coalition formation, but only so long as the number of parties in the system is sufficiently large. There is no evidence for the Signaling Hypothesis.

While electoral institutions are clearly an important determinant of electoral coalition formation, I argue in the conclusion to chapter three that the implication in the coalition literature that pre-electoral coalitions are a simple function of electoral rules is probably too reductionist. I claim that a more nuanced understanding of pre-electoral coalition formation must take account of the distributional costs in terms of policy and office benefits that arise during coalition bargaining, as well as the potential electoral benefits. I develop a model of electoral coalition formation that takes account of these distributional costs in chapter four. The model is a bargaining game between two party leaders who must decide whether to form an electoral alliance or not. I derive several implications that relate the likelihood of pre-electoral coalition formation to various institutional and ideological features of the party system. Of the hypotheses that are generated, the most important are that electoral coalitions are more likely when the potential coalition partners share similar ideological preferences; when electoral institutions generate an electoral bonus for competing as a coalition; when the party’s expected share of office benefits from running alone decreases; when the likelihood of entering government after running alone decreases; and when there is an extreme opposition and the coalition is electorally beneficial.

In the following chapter, I use a detailed investigation of electoral coalitions in
Fifth Republic France and post-1987 South Korea to illustrate the causal process of pre-electoral coalition formation and the plausibility of my model’s assumptions and implications. The unusual nature of the French semi-presidential regime offers an opportunity to examine the impact of different electoral institutions, namely legislative and presidential elections, on pre-electoral strategies while holding other country characteristics constant. Moreover, the French case provides a dramatic example of the impact that pre-electoral coalitions (or their absence) can have on election outcomes. The South Korean case supports the notion that there truly is an underlying general logic of electoral coalition formation. Although France is a country in Western Europe with a well-established democratic pedigree and South Korea is a relatively new democracy in East Asia, similar factors play an influential role in pre-electoral coalition formation in both countries. For example, evidence from both South Korea and France indicate that distributional issues play a significant role in determining the ease with which electoral coalitions form. If these issues can be resolved, then even the most strident and long-held personal animosities among party leaders can be overcome. The South Korean case also provides evidence that my model of electoral coalition formation can be usefully applied to presidential democracies.

In chapter six, I conduct a cross-national statistical analysis of the hypotheses generated by my bargaining model using a data set containing information on potential coalition dyads in 292 legislative elections in 20 advanced industrialized parliamentary democracies between 1946 and 1998. The results provide strong support for all of my hypotheses. Pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form when parties are ideologically compatible, when the expected coalition size is large (but not too large), and when the potential coalition partners are of similar size. They are also more likely to form if the party system is ideologically polarized and the electoral rules are disproportional.

In the seventh chapter, I begin to link my study of pre-electoral coalition formation more directly with the existing government coalition literature by examining several aspects of the relationship between electoral and government coalitions. I find that electoral coalitions significantly increase the likelihood that member parties enter government; in other words, they affect the identity of government coalitions. I also find that governments that are based on pre-electoral agreements are not only more ideologically compatible than those that are not, but that they also get to take office more quickly. While there are several reasons to think that electoral coalitions might also improve government stability, I find no evidence to support this idea. Overall, the evidence presented in this chapter indicates that the effect of pre-electoral coalitions does not end with the counting of votes and the allocation of legislative seats; electoral coalitions continue to affect important aspects of the government formation process even after elections are over.
In the conclusion, I summarize the theoretical, empirical, and methodological contributions that my study makes to our understanding of electoral coalitions, and I address its normative implications. I also suggest that, although this book represents the first systematic, cross-national analysis to focus on pre-electoral coalitions, a fruitful area of future research would be to develop a more unified approach to government formation that simultaneously incorporates both pre-electoral and government coalitions.
NOTES

Notes to Chapter 1

1. I use the terms 'electoral' or 'pre-electoral' interchangeably to characterize coalitions that form prior to elections.

2. Electoral coalitions can also play a role in determining the identity of the government in countries with more proportional electoral rules. For example, the presence of an electoral coalition can affect the choice of government formateur or allow a small party that is a potential government member to surpass an electoral threshold. By affecting the identity of the government, electoral coalitions ultimately influence the types of policy that get implemented. This is the case whether the electoral system is disproportional, as in the stylized example above, or not.

3. Some of these studies do take account of the pre-election environment by incorporating voter choice and candidate entry (Shepsle 1991). For instance, Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) analyze the strategic behavior of voters in their model of government coalition formation. Other more recent work combines voter behavior with post-election elite bargaining (Glasgow & Alvarez 2005; Quinn & Martin 2002). However, none of these analyses ever explicitly allows for pre-electoral coalition formation.

4. I know of only one major cross-national statistical analysis that takes account of pre-electoral coalitions (Martin & Stevenson 2001). However, just as in the rest of the literature, the goal of this study is to better understand government coalitions, not electoral coalitions. Extremely recently, several papers have appeared examining electoral coalitions between particular parties in France (Blais and Indridason 2004; Spoon 2004; Fauvelle-Aymar & Lewis-Beck 2005).

5. Kaminski (2001) uses a cooperative game-theoretic model to examine pre-electoral coalitions and party mergers in Poland in the 1990s. However, his analysis has not been extended to other cases and does not take account of bargaining or policy issues.

6. I do not claim that pre-electoral coalitions will automatically be electorally advantageous. After all, it may be the case that a coalition is composed of parties that are so ideologically incompatible that their respective electorates refuse to vote for the coalition.

7. Note that this does not have to be the case for a coalition to be advantageous. A coalition that attracts more votes than either party could win on its own, but fewer than the total number of votes they would win running independently, may still be useful if it increases the probability that this coalition enters government or becomes the formateur.

Notes to Chapter 2

1. Powell (2000) has collected data on government majorities that were identifiable
prior to elections. Although he includes some pre-electoral coalitions in his analysis, they are certainly not the main focus of his book. Martin and Stevenson (2001) include a pre-electoral coalition variable in their analysis of government coalitions. However, as I note in chapter seven, they significantly underestimate the presence of electoral coalitions in their sample.

2. Convergencia i Unió is an electoral coalition between the Democratic Convergence of Catalonia and the Democratic Union of Catalonia. Unidade Galega, known as the Socialist Galeca Block in 1982 and the Socialist Galeca-Left Galeca in 1986, is composed of several small Galician parties. The Galician National Popular Block is another Galician electoral coalition in which the Marxist Unión do Pobo Galego is the dominant party. The Basque Left is an electoral coalition of left-wing Basque parties, while Herri Batasuna is an electoral coalition of more extreme left-wing parties in the Basque region.

3. These two electoral coalitions formed in the 1993 legislative elections (Kohno 1997, 139–41, 149). One electoral coalition comprised the Clean Government Party, the Democratic Socialist Party, the Socialist Democratic Federation, the Japan Renewal Party (Shinsei-to) and the Japan Socialist Party. The other comprised the New Party (Sakigake) and the Japan New Party. Both electoral coalitions entered government in 1993.

4. There was a coalition between the Center Party and the Christian League of Finland in 1970 (Arter 1999, 110), a coalition between the Liberals and the Center Party in 1983 (Esaiasson & Heidar 2000, 447–48), and the Purple Coalition in 1999 (personal correspondence with Mark Hallerberg). For more on electoral coalitions in Finland, see Sundberg (2002) and Kuitunen (2002).

5. I do not include Switzerland in this book because my statistical analyses focus on parliamentary, rather than presidential, systems. Were I to do so, though, it would present other ambiguous cases. Parties in Switzerland often form electoral coalitions in particular cantons; however, they are not nation-wide coalitions. The ‘magic formula’ used after 1959 to determine coalition government composition means that everyone knows in advance which parties will end up in government (Kerr 1987) and that “elections do not have a direct impact on the government composition” (Caramani 1996). I do not consider this agreement over government composition to constitute a pre-electoral coalition, since the parties in question do not coordinate their electoral strategies. Moreover, members of the executive council are elected individually by the parliament and are not “constrained by interparty policy deals” (Church 2004, 20, 117–18). Thus, although Switzerland has pre-electoral coalitions at the local level and the ‘magic formula’ at the national level, I would code Switzerland as having no national-level pre-electoral coalitions.

6. Prior to the 1960s, the Liberal Party also formed several local electoral coalitions with the Conservative Party. These coalitions took the form of nomination agreements, in which the Liberals agreed “not to contest a particular seat if the Conservatives refrained from offering a candidate in another seat” (Rasmussen 1991, 167).

7. Identifying electoral coalitions in Israel is further complicated by the fact that some parties that form an electoral alliance for certain elections later merge into a single party, where the original constituent parties exist as separate factions. This was the case with Mapai and its electoral alliance partners when they merged to form the Labor Party in 1968. Fortunately the act of officially forming a party does tend to be mentioned in the lit-
erature on elections and parties in Israel.

8. For a more detailed discussion of electoral coordination in mixed and multi-tier electoral systems with dual ballots, see Ferrara & Herron (2005).

9. Because the National and Liberal parties have such a long-standing electoral agreement, most of their pre-electoral bargaining is not actually over the flow of preferences, but rather over the number of districts in which both should compete and the extent to which their policy platforms differ (Sharman, Sayers, & Miragliotta 2002).

Notes to Chapter 3

1. Note that this is equivalent to saying that an increase in the number of parties will only raise the likelihood of pre-electoral coalitions when the electoral system is sufficiently disproportional.

2. However, some commentators analyzing Dutch politics have suggested that electoral coalitions have not been very effective in giving Dutch voters more say over the composition of their governments. For example, De Jong and Pijnenburg (1986, 148) state that “the making of a [government] coalition remains the crucial moment despite the efforts . . . towards more ‘political clarity’ and pre-electoral agreements . . . Dutch voters will never decide on the composition of their government.”

3. A slightly different scenario took place in Italy in 1996, when a number of center-left parties running under the heading of Olive Tree agreed to go into government together if they were successful at the polls. While the Communist Refoundation (RC) was not part of this coalition and had no intention of going into government with the Olive Tree, it did reach nomination agreements with the member parties of the Olive Tree to avoid splitting the left-wing vote in a number of constituencies (Daniels 1999, 85–86). Following the election, the Olive Tree coalition entered government, and the RC simply supported it from the legislature (Newell 2000, 38). In this case, I do consider that the government was based on an electoral coalition.

4. For another analysis of how electoral system disproportionality and party system size affect the probability of electoral coalition formation, see S. Golder (2005).

5. The effective threshold is the mean of the thresholds of representation and exclusion. It is calculated as

\[ \frac{50\%}{M+1} + \frac{50\%}{2M} \]

where \( M \) is the district magnitude. If there are legal thresholds and/or upper-tier seats, the calculation is slightly more complicated (Lijphart 1994, 25–30). For more information on electoral thresholds, see Taagepera (1998a, 1998b).

Notes to Chapter 4

1. However, it is important to recognize that actual election results may rule out certain combinations, so that a party may reconsider its alliance strategy afterwards. It may
also be the case that voters do not clearly show their support for a particular electoral coalition. In these circumstances, party leaders can more easily justify not honoring the terms of the electoral coalition. After all, agreements over the division of government spoils do not necessarily specify appropriate behavior if the coalition loses. It is, perhaps, interesting to note that some pre-electoral agreements are sufficiently detailed that they take these possibilities into account and prescribe particular actions. This is an indication that party leaders are clearly aware of the commitment problems associated with electoral coalitions.

2. If the main issue for voters in a particular election was incumbent corruption, then parties at opposing extremes could potentially form an anti-incumbent, anti-corruption electoral coalition that could generate a significant amount of voter support. In fact, this is the story often told of the defeat of the Congress Party in India in 1989 (Andersen 1990).

3. Note that the fact that a coalition may be sub-additive does not necessarily mean that it offers no significant electoral gains. It is possible for a coalition to be sub-additive and yet still be sufficiently large to represent the largest ‘party,’ thereby winning itself the role of government formateur.

4. This does not rule out the possibility that politicians will overestimate the support they would receive from running separately or from forming an electoral coalition. Estimates of party or coalition support are likely to be uncertain in volatile or new party systems. Although the extent to which these estimates are inaccurate can obviously affect the range in which coalition bargains are feasible, I have not explicitly modeled this source of uncertainty.

5. The core of any bargaining game is that two players are bargaining over a ‘pie.’ The size of this pie is typically normalized to 1. An agreement is a pair \((x_1, x_2)\), in which \(x_1\) is Player A’s share of the pie and \(x_2\) Player B’s share. The set of possible agreements is: \(X = \{(x_1, x_2) \in \mathbb{R}^2 : x_1 + x_2 = 1 \text{ and } x_i \geq 0 \text{ for } i = 1, 2\}\).

6. As long as party leaders have single-peaked preferences over the policy space, then the use of a quadratic loss function does not affect any of the model’s implications.

7. It is not difficult to see that this feature of presidential elections would make it rather difficult to find a coalition bargain acceptable to both sides. The problems caused by non-divisible presidential offices will be illustrated in the next chapter.

8. Although there are three possible sub-game perfect Nash equilibria, there is always a unique sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium for any given set of values for the model’s parameters.

9. However, this assumption is not entirely innocuous, since it does affect the number of possible sub-game perfect Nash equilibria. It turns out that if I allow the players to remain indifferent between making and not making an offer, there would be an additional equilibrium in which Party A makes an offer, B rejects this offer, and B makes no counter-offer. The outcome would be that no electoral coalition forms.

10. If this assumption is not made and the players are allowed to remain indifferent, then there is a fourth sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. The outcome is that Player A makes an initial offer, which is rejected. The game enters a second period, but Player B does not make a counter offer. The end result is that no electoral coalition forms.
Notes to Chapter 5


2. The electoral system used for the 1986 elections was different. In an attempt to prevent an expected right-wing legislative majority, President Mitterrand introduced a proportional representation system similar to that used in the Fourth Republic. He hoped that this system would encourage voters to support the extremist National Front and siphon off votes from the moderate right-wing parties. Although a large number of voters did support the National Front, the leader of the moderate right, Jacques Chirac, still managed to become prime minister, albeit with a legislative majority of just two. Chirac immediately restored the traditional two-round electoral system.

3. The early 5% threshold was based on the actual number of votes cast. When the threshold was raised to 10% in 1966, the percentage of votes a party now needed to advance to the second round was 10% of the registered voters. This method remained in place when the threshold was raised to 12.5% (Duhamel 1999, 138–39). Given turnout levels, a party often needs around 17% of the actual vote to qualify for the second round.

4. A small number of moderate right-wing deputies regularly call for an electoral coalition with the National Front in certain districts. However, they tend to be isolated very quickly by the party elites (Hecht & Mandonnet 1998). For example, when several mainstream right politicians were elected with the help of the National Front in the cantonal and regional elections of 1998, President Chirac immediately went on national television to denounce all alliances between the moderate and the extreme right. The politicians were then kicked out of their parties (Martin 1999).

5. Cohabitation refers to a time when the presidential and prime ministerial positions are held by people from opposing parties.

6. The origins of this federation can be found in a series of discussions that took place around the presidential candidate of a mysterious ‘Monsieur X.’ It was only once the idea of a candidate of the center-Left had been ‘tested’ in the weekly magazine, L’Express, that Gaston Deferre came out and announced that he was actually Monsieur X (Chagnollaud & Quermonne 1996).

7. The PCF were opposed to the alliance, because they did not want to be sidelined as they had been in the Fourth Republic. Since the Gaullists opposed the alliance and wanted the centrist voters for themselves, they constantly raised the religious issue to drive a wedge between the Socialists and the MRP.

8. Parties of the right during the Third and Fourth Republics had always suffered from elite fragmentation and the poor organization of their mass electoral following. However, the Gaullists were able to gain control of the local ‘notables’ and achieve a high degree of parliamentary discipline, centralization, and nationalization (Schain 1991).

9. The other three cases include one with multiple left-wing candidates, and two with multiple right-wing candidates. In the fourth district in the Maine-et-Loire department, the left-wing candidate managed to win with only 36.57% of the vote, because two mainstream-Right candidates split the right-wing vote between them.
10. In the proportional representation elections of 1986, the UDF and the Gaullists ran joint lists in 61 of the 96 electoral districts. They ran separate lists in the remaining 35.

11. Along with a small band of followers, the UDF leader François Bayrou was one of the few who refused to join the new ‘Union for a Presidential Majority.’ He was worried that the Gaullists would dominate the new coalition and control the bulk of the campaign funding from the government.

12. Socialist voters were much less likely to vote for a Communist candidate in the second round than Communist voters were to support a Socialist candidate. The vast majority of centrist voters simply refused to vote for an electoral union of the Left led by the PCF (Hanley 2002; Bell & Criddle 1984; Johnson 1981; Alexandre 1977).

13. Rivalry among the various leaders of the moderate Left was intense; anecdotes of the personal nature of this rivalry are rife in the descriptive literature (Du Roy & Schneider 1982; Alexandre 1977). It is important to note that this rivalry did not prevent the merger. As a result, one should be wary of the ‘personal animosity’ story as an explanation for coordination failure.

14. It is important to remember that the 1986 election was held under a proportional representation system. It is worth stating, though, that there is some doubt as to how many of the French voters actually realized this prior to the election. The simulation would certainly be more useful had the poll been taken during an election held under the usual two-round system.

15. Analysts of French politics often refer to the parties on the right using a typology developed by René Rémond (1982), according to which the Right has been divided since Napoleon into Orleanist, Bonapartist, and Monarchist wings. In recent years, references to this typology have diminished. For a further discussion, see Golder (2000).

16. There were seven candidates representing the Right. See http://www.election-politique.com for a complete listing of candidates and results.

17. So far, the National Front has not managed to win seats in the legislature, with the exception of 35 seats in the 1986 proportional representation elections.

18. As one might expect, these electoral agreements are often a source of conflict between the party elites and the local candidates.

19. Both Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung were confident of at least receiving the votes from their own native region (Im 2000; Nam 1989, 196; Dong 1988, 181–82).

20. Although the Korean system is often treated as presidential (Przeworski et al. 2000), it does have a prime minister subject to the approval of parliament. The president is not responsible to parliament and does not have the ability to dissolve it. The government of the prime minister can be brought down, though, by a vote of no confidence. In many ways, this system is similar to that used in France. The main difference is that the South Korean president does not have the power to dissolve the parliament, as the French president does.

21. In the absence of ideological conflict, regional distinctions have become central to much of Korean politics. Regional antagonisms were encouraged during Park Chung Hee’s reign (Nam 1989, 279, 316–17). This applies particularly to the split between the Cholla region and the rest of the country. Morriss (1996) says that regional voting did not develop before the 1970s but has grown rapidly since then. He emphasizes that this pattern is a political construct, since there are no intrinsic regional differences, and that in “the absence
of other socio-economic cleavages, regional attachments provide a way for leaders to differentiate themselves, and a basis on which to appeal to their supporters."

22. Kim Dae Jung also promised to change the institutional setup and create more of a parliamentary regime in which the president would have no more than a ceremonial role (Diamond & Shin 2000; Kim 2000b). Since parliament was controlled by Kim Young Sam’s party at the time, it would obviously be difficult to get such a measure passed. As a result, this second promise was never entirely credible.

23. Kim Young Sam’s long-term rival, Kim Dae Jung, came second with 33.8% of the vote, while Chung Ju Yung came third with 16.3%.

24. Shortly before the election, though, Chung abruptly ended his alliance with Roh. Despite this change, Roh still won the election.

Notes to Chapter 6

1. Kaminski (2001) has used a similar survey approach to the one suggested here to analyze coalition stability in Poland.

2. Dyadic data is also the format of choice in the international relations literature addressing coalition or alliance behavior.

3. ‘Government potential’ refers to a party that is a former, actual, or (realistically) possible member of government. ‘Blackmail potential’ refers to a party that is able to affect the tactics of party competition among government-oriented parties (Budge et al. 2001, 216). The Budge et al. criteria are themselves drawn from Sartori (1976).

4. Random effects are similar to fixed effects in that they are both used to model unobserved heterogeneity. However, they measure unobserved heterogeneity in different ways. The fixed effects model introduces dummy variables, essentially modeling unobserved heterogeneity as an intercept shift. In contrast, a random effects estimation models unobserved heterogeneity with an additional disturbance term that is drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero. There are at least two reasons why random effects are preferable here. Theoretically, a random-effects specification is more appropriate when inferences are being made about a population on the basis of a sample as is the case here (Greene 2003; Hsiao 2003). More practically, running a fixed-effects model by election would mean that all elections in which no pre-electoral coalition formed would be dropped. Doing so would leave me with only 37% of the observations and potentially introduces selection bias.

5. The log-likelihood from the model with random effects is $-625.79$, while the log-likelihood from the model without them is $-681.29$. This gives a $\chi^2$ statistic of 111.0, i.e., $2(-625.79 + 681.29) = 111.0$. The p-value of obtaining a $\chi^2$ statistic of this magnitude or larger if the random effects are not required is less than .0001, with one degree of freedom. This result strongly suggests that random effects should be retained.

6. Confidence intervals are based on simulations using 10,000 draws from the estimated coefficient vector and variance-covariance matrix.

7. One might also wonder about the predictive power of my analysis. As with all rare event data, the predicted probability of a pre-electoral coalition forming is quite low (King & Zeng 2001). However, the results from my analysis show that the mean predicted prob-
ability of an electoral coalition forming for those dyads that actually did form an electoral coalition (.10) is twice as large as the mean predicted probability for those dyads that did not form a coalition (.05). The fact that simulations show that we can be highly confident (greater than 99%) that these mean predicted probabilities are different provides support for the predictive power of my analysis.

8. I show the effect of a change in Polarization by one standard deviation from its mean both when Effective Threshold is at its minimum value and when it is at its maximum value. This result shows the effect of a reasonable change in Polarization over the whole range of values of Effective Threshold in the sample. I do this for the other interacted variables as well.

Notes to Chapter 7

1. See Martin & Stevenson (2001, 38) for a discussion of the reasons why more traditional regression methods are unsuitable for analyzing which parties enter government.

2. Martin & Stevenson do, in fact, code some potential government coalitions as being based on pre-electoral agreements during inter-election periods. They do not discuss the justification for coding these observations in this way.

3. The test essentially involves comparing the estimated parameters produced by a fully specified model (all potential choices are included) with the estimated parameters from a model where the set of choices is restricted (some choices have been dropped). If IIA holds and the dropped choices are irrelevant, then the estimates of the model parameters will be the same. While Martin & Stevenson conducted their test by randomly dropping 20% of the potential government coalitions, I employed a more stringent test and randomly dropped 50% of the potential governments. I then repeated this procedure 50 times to make sure that the randomization procedure did not produce an unusual answer. If the p-value from the test is less than .05, then the null hypothesis of IIA is rejected. The average p-values from the 50 tests for the four models that I estimated in table 7.1 range from .69 to .89. I also conducted more stringent tests, where I dropped more than 50% of the potential government coalitions; I was still unable to reject the IIA assumption.

4. By the same logic, one might also worry about the omission of Investiture from the model, since this variable is interacted with Minority status. However, Investiture does not vary across the choices for a given formation opportunity, and including it along with its interaction with Minority status would lead to perfect multi-collinearity. Thus, omitting the constitutive term Investiture is appropriate and necessary in this particular case (Brambor, Clark, & Golder 2006).

5. Martin & Stevenson draw this same inference, but in slightly different terms. They state that “[v]ery strong parties do tend to get into government and, even more, to rule alone” (2001, 46).

6. The inclusion of the constitutive term Single Party also affects some of the other coefficients. For example, it increases the size of the coefficient on Minimal Winning Coalitions by 43% and reduces the size of the coefficient on Ideological Divisions by 26%. This is just further evidence of the bias arising from the omission of Single Party in Model 1.

7. These two claims cannot be verified by simply looking at the results in Model 3.
and comparing them to those in Model 2. However, the results from a model in which I interact all of the variables in table 7.1 with a Post-Election dummy variable do support these claims—the coefficients on the interaction terms Minimal Winning Coalition × Post-Election and Pre-Electoral Pact × Post-Election are both positive and significant in this model. These results are not shown.

8. The odds that a potential coalition becomes the government if it is based on a pre-electoral coalition compared to the exact same potential coalition that is not based on an electoral pact is calculated as $e^{\beta_{PEC}}$ where $\beta_{PEC}$ is the coefficient on the Pre-Electoral Coalition variable in table 7.1 (Long 1997, 168–70).

9. In addition, non-political factors such as holidays affect the length of time between the election and the date the new government takes office. For instance, forming the German government at the end of the year in 1990 took extra time because of the Christmas holidays (Saalfeld 2000, 48).

10. The data in table 7.2 refer only to governments that formed after an election. Governments also form in inter-election periods after a cabinet falls. The mean length of time that it takes to form a government in an inter-election period is only 13.5 days. A difference in means test indicates that we can be well over 99% confident that governments that form after an election take a much longer time to take office than those that form in an inter-election period.

11. The hazard rate has two components. The first is a set of covariates that are hypothesized to systematically affect the timing of an event. The second is the baseline hazard function that indicates the rate of event occurrence when all the covariates are zero, i.e., the baseline hazard reflects how the rate of event occurrence changes with time only (Martin & Vanberg 2003).

12. The results from a generalized gamma model, as well as an examination of the Cox-Snell residuals, indicate that the Weibull model is appropriate for examining the duration of government formation (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004, 41–43, 124–25, 137–39). The fact that the results from a Cox proportional hazards model are qualitatively similar to those that I obtain from the Weibull model indicates that I can be particularly confident that my results are not dependent on my choice of the Weibull distribution to parameterize the baseline hazard function. This is because the Cox model does not have to specify a particular distribution of the hazard rate. The results from estimating the Cox model also indicate that the proportional hazards assumption underlying both the Weibull and Cox models is not violated—the p-value from the global test of the Schoenfeld residuals is .21 (Grambsch & Therneau 1994; Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004; Cleves, Gould, & Gutierrez 2004, 178–80).


14. Figure 7.1 illustrates the change in expected duration as the Pre-Electoral Coalition variable goes from 0 to 1 across the range of observed values for Government Parties. The change in expected duration in the Weibull model for a given number of Government Parties is calculated as:

$$E(T_{\text{PEC}=0}|\text{Parties}) - E(T_{\text{PEC}=1}|\text{Parties}) = \left[\left(\frac{1}{\lambda}\right)^\gamma \Gamma\left(1 + \frac{1}{\rho}\right)\right]_{\text{PEC}=0|\text{Parties}} - \left[\left(\frac{1}{\lambda}\right)^\gamma \Gamma\left(1 + \frac{1}{\rho}\right)\right]_{\text{PEC}=1|\text{Parties}} \quad (7.2)$$
where $\lambda = e^{\theta}$ is a scale parameter, $\rho$ is a shape parameter, and $\Gamma$ is the gamma function. Confidence intervals around this change in expected duration are based on simulations using 10,000 draws from the estimated coefficient vector and variance-covariance matrix. Change in expected duration and confidence intervals are then calculated for all of the observed values of Government Parties, and these values are then plotted in figure 7.1.

15. In addition to using the Ideological Range variable, I also examined whether the Ideological Spread and Ideological Connectedness of the incoming government affected the duration of the government formation process. I found no evidence that they did. These additional variables are described in some detail in the next section.

16. I should note, though, that the 1977 Spanish government was actually based on a 14-party pre-electoral coalition. The problem is that the ideological data from the Manifesto Research Group have this government coded as a single party even though the parties did not merge until 1978.

17. As Laver (2003, 30) notes in a recent review article on government duration and termination, scholars have “tended to assemble a portfolio of independent variables gleaned from previous published work and the author’s own ideas, each given a brief ad hoc ‘theoretical’ justification in its own terms. But the set of independent variables taken as a whole does not amount to the empirical elaboration of a coherent model of government termination.”

18. In some cases, both sets of scholars will find a model and sample that support their ‘contradictory’ theoretical claims. For example, Strøm (1985) argues and finds that the number of days of ‘crisis’ before a government forms increases cabinet duration, while King et al. (1990) argue and find that the same variable actually decreases cabinet duration.

19. For example, much of the debate over questions of government duration has centered on the advantages of survival analysis as compared to ordinary least squares regression (King et al. 1990), whether the hazard rate is rising or falling and how it should be interpreted (Alt & King 1994; Warwick 1992, 1994; Beck 1998), and whether analysts should be employing a competing risks model or not (Diermeier & Stevenson 1999).

20. While Warwick (1994, 42) seems aware of some these problems, this does not change the fact that this type of procedure is problematic in the presence of multi-collinearity and leads to confidence intervals that are too small and $p$-values that cannot be interpreted in the usual way (Altman & Andersen 1989). Another problem is that this elimination procedure cannot distinguish between predictors of direct substantive interest and those whose effects one wants to control for (Singer & Willett 2003). Moreover, the end result is a model that tends to be sample specific. This last point may help to explain why the results from government duration models are not always robust across different samples.

21. Warwick does provide measures for different definitions of the government; he just prefers the more inclusive definition stated above.

22. The principal reason for employing the Weibull model earlier was that it made it easier to evaluate the conditional effect of pre-electoral coalitions on government bargaining delays in figure 7.1.

23. Censoring issues occur when the analyst does not observe the end of a duration period (right-censoring), while truncation issues occur when the analyst does not observe the duration of an observation that occurs prior to the start point of the data (left-truncation).
24. Although Warwick’s data actually start in 1945, I only have data on pre-electoral coalitions from 1946.

25. Another source of data commonly used in the government duration literature is King et al. (1990). These data measure government duration in months, whereas the two data sources that I employed measure it in days. Since the data provided by King et al. are less accurate, I did not use them in my analysis.

26. Competing risks (or multiple destination) models take account of the fact that observations can terminate in different ways (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004). I employ a latent survivor time approach to the competing risks problem where there are two specific destination states (dissolution or replacement), each of which has a latent failure time associated with it for each observation (Diermeier & Stevenson 1999).

27. I have already shown in previous sections that pre-electoral coalitions increase the ideological compatibility of governments and shorten the length of time that it takes to form a government. As a result, one might reasonably wonder if the effect of pre-electoral coalitions on government survival is being muted by the fact that I include Ideological Range and Formation Attempts as independent variables in table 7.5. However, analyses where I drop Ideological Range and Formation Attempts do not change my inferences.

28. The ‘——’ symbol for the risk of dissolution indicates that the coefficient on Caretaker Government tends toward infinity, because there are no cases (Warwick data) or only one case (PDDA data) of a caretaker government that forms after an election ending in dissolution (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004, 171). The one case of a caretaker government ending in dissolution in the PDDA data occurs in Iceland in 1959. Since the categorization of this particular government is open to interpretation, I should note that my results do not change if this government is not classified as a caretaker government (Indriðason 2004).

29. A cursory glance at the data reveals that Warwick and PDDA often measure the number of foiled formation attempts for the same governments differently. In fact, the correlation between the Warwick and PDDA variables is only 0.54.

Notes to Chapter 8

1. There are a few exceptions, of course. For example, Powell (2000) makes a point of considering both single parties and pre-electoral coalitions in ‘majoritarian’ democracies. He does so because he is interested in the identifiability of government alternatives. However, a more typical example is Laver and Schofield (1998, 1). Although they include a nice discussion of pre-electoral coalitions in their book on multi-party government, they still state that the “[t]he special forms of bargaining and negotiation that characterize the politics of coalition can be found after nearly every election that does not produce an unassailable ‘winner’ in the shape of a single party that controls a majority of the seats in the legislature.” Emphasis added.

2. This suggests that a cooperative game-theoretic approach where coalitions automatically form whenever they are expected to be super-additive in seats or votes (Kaminski 2001) is less appropriate for modeling electoral coalition formation than the non-cooperative approach that I employ in this book.
REFERENCES


References


REFERENCES


REFERENCES


REFERENCES


REFERENCES


REFERENCES


AUTHOR INDEX

Akzin, Benjamin, 18
Alexandre, Philippe, 66, 176n12
Alt, James E., 126, 180n19
Altman, D. G., 180n20
Alvarez, Michael R., 107, 109, 171n3
Amorim Neto, Octavio, 25
Andersen, P. K., 180n20
Andersen, Walter K., 27, 174n2
Andeweg, Rudy B., 21, 27, 115
Argersinger, Peter H., 25
Arter, David, 172n4
Ashworth, Scott, 7, 104
Austen-Smith, David, 4, 40, 107, 171n3
Axelrod, Robert, 107
Bäck, Hannah, 107
Backman, François, 68
Banks, Jeffrey, 4, 40, 107, 171n3
Baron, David, 4
Bawn, Kathleen, 137
Beck, Nathaniel, xiii, 33, 180n19
Becker, Jean-Jacques, 65
Bell, David S., 5, 17, 56, 59, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 71, 72, 176n12
Bergman, Torbjörn, xiii, 115, 118, 130, 131
Bergounioux, A., 115, 118, 130, 131
Bergounioux, Angéline, 75
Box-Steppensmeier, Janet M., 129, 179n12, 181n26, 181n28
Boy, Daniel, 76
Brambor, Thomas, 35, 92, 109, 178n4
Brams, Steven, xiii, 123
Braumoeller, Bear, 109
Bréchon, Pierre, 65
Browne, Eric C., 106, 126
Budge, Ian, 3, 4, 16, 20, 21, 23, 27–28, 29, 40, 86, 89, 107, 108, 113, 118, 123, 125, 130, 131, 177n3
Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan, 7, 104
Campbell, Peter, 69, 73
Caramani, Daniel, 172n5
Cayrol, Roland, 68
Chagnollaud, D., 175n6
Charlot, Jean, 61, 65, 73
Cheibub, José, 106
Chhibber, Pradeep, 25
Christensen, Ray, 13
Church, Clive H., 172n5
Cioffi-Revilla, Claudio, 126
Clark, William Roberts, xiii, 7, 25, 35, 87, 92, 104, 109, 178n4
Cleves, Mario A., 118, 179n12
Cole, Alastair, 69, 73
Cox, Gary W., 7, 25, 31, 104
Criddle, Byron, 59, 63, 64, 71, 176n12
Cunha, Carlos, 19
Daniels, Philip, 18, 173n3
De Jong, Jan, 3, 27, 173n2
De Swaan, Abram, 18–19, 107
De Winter, Lieven, 28, 115
Diamond, Larry, 177n22
Diermeier, Daniel, 4, 114, 121, 127, 128, 132, 133, 180n19, 181n26
Donegan, Jean-Marie, 73
Dong, Wonmo, 78, 176n19
Downs, Anthony, 39
Downs, William, 42
Druckman, James N., xiii, 4, 45, 107, 127, 128, 133
Du Roy, Albert, 65, 70, 72, 176n13
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duhamel, Alain</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duhamel, Olivier</td>
<td>58, 61, 73, 175n3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dumont, Patrick</td>
<td>28, 115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duverger, Maurice</td>
<td>7, 24–25, 49, 73, 104, 144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easton, S. T.</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elazar, Daniel J.</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enelow, James</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eraslan, Hulya</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esaiasson, Peter</td>
<td>172n4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fabre, Robert</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farrell, Brian</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fauvelle-Aymar, Christine</td>
<td>171n4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferejohn, John</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferrara, Frederico</td>
<td>173n8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franklin, Mark N.</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frears, J. R.</td>
<td>63, 64, 66, 71, 72, 73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freindreis, John P.</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friedrich, Robert</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fysch, Peter</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaffney, John</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallagher, Michael</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gildea, Robert</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glasgow, Garrett</td>
<td>171n3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gleiber, Dennis W.</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golder, Matt, xv</td>
<td>7, 25, 29, 30, 35, 87, 92, 104, 109, 178n4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golder, Sona N.</td>
<td>66, 173n4, 176n15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goldey, David</td>
<td>5, 62, 71, 72, 73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gould, William W.</td>
<td>118, 179n12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grambsch, P. M.</td>
<td>179n12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greene, William H.</td>
<td>177n4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grofman, Bernard</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grunberg, Gérard</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gutierrez, Roberto G.</td>
<td>118, 179n12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hallerberg, Mark</td>
<td>xiii, 172n4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han, Sung-Joo</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hancock, M. Donald</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanley, David</td>
<td>62, 69, 70, 72, 176n12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harrison, Martin</td>
<td>62, 71, 72, 73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hayward, Jack</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hecht, Emmanuel</td>
<td>70, 175n4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heidar, Kurt</td>
<td>172n4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henderson, Gregory</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herron, Erik S.</td>
<td>173n8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hillebrand, Ron</td>
<td>21, 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hinich, Melvin J.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hofferbert, R.</td>
<td>3, 20, 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsiao, Cheng</td>
<td>177n4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huber, John</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Im, Hyug Baeg</td>
<td>176n19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indriðason, Indriði</td>
<td>xiii, 125, 171n4, 181n28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irwin, Galen A.</td>
<td>21, 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackson, Julian</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaffré, Jérome</td>
<td>66, 69, 72, 73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaung, Hoon</td>
<td>78–79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenson, Jane</td>
<td>62, 63, 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson, R. W.</td>
<td>61–62, 63, 64, 71, 72, 176n12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson, Stephen</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jones, Bradford S.</td>
<td>129, 179n12, 181n26, 181n28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jones, Michael A.</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judt, Tony</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaminski, Marek</td>
<td>xiii, 41, 42, 122, 171n5, 177n1, 181n2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katz, Jonathan</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keeler, John T. S.</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keman, Hans</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerr, Henry H.</td>
<td>172n5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kihl, Young Whan</td>
<td>78, 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilgour, D. Marc</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim, Byung-Kook</td>
<td>78–79, 80, 81, 177n22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim, HeeMin</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King, Gary</td>
<td>4, 89, 98, 126, 128, 130, 177n7, 180n19, 181n25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klingemann, H.-D.</td>
<td>3, 20, 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knapp, Andrew</td>
<td>5, 56, 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kohno, Masaru</td>
<td>172n3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kollman, Ken</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koole, Ruud A.</td>
<td>18–19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Kuhn, Thomas, 139
Kuitunen, Soile, 172n4
Laakso, Markku, 29
Lavau, George, 72
Laver, Michael, 4, 21, 23–24, 28, 29, 40, 45, 86, 106, 107–8, 111, 113, 126, 127, 128, 180n17, 181n1
Leblang, David, 105, 114
Leiserson, Michael, 107
Lewis-Beck, Michael, xiii, 171n4
Lijphart, Arend, 7, 25, 31, 90, 137, 173n5
Long, J. Scott, 107, 179n8
Lupia, Arthur, xiii, 4, 126
Mackie, Thomas, 21, 106
Mair, Peter, 14, 106
Mandonnet, Eric, 70, 175n4
Martin, Andrew D., 171n3
Martin, Pierre, 65, 175n4
Massart, Alexis, 59, 68
Mayhew, David, 39
Mazey, Sonia, 73
McCAllister, Ian, 20
McFadden, D., 107
Melchior, Eric, 64, 71
Mény, Yves, 68
Merlo, Antonio, 4
Mershon, Carol, 11
Miragliotta, N., 173n9
Mitchell, Paul, 3, 20, 40
Morriss, Peter, 79, 176n21
Morrow, James, 39
Mossuz-Lavau, Janine, 72
Mukherjee, Bumba, 105, 114
Müller, Wolfgang C., 3, 4, 6, 21, 38, 115, 118, 125, 130, 131
Nagler, Jonathan, xiii, 107, 109
Nam, Koon Woo, 78, 176n19, 176n21
Narud, Hanne Marthe, 21, 28
Nay, Catherine, 5
Newell, James L., 173n3
Norpoth, Helmut, 21
Nousiainen, Jaako, 13, 116
Oberdorfer, Don, 79
Oh, John Kie-chiang, 78–79
Osborne, Martin, 39
Pappi, Franz Urban, 27
Park, Jin, 78–79
Parodi, Lean-Luc, 63, 64, 66, 71, 72, 73
Pierce, Roy, 57
Pijnenburg, Bert, 3, 27, 173n2
Pinto-Duschinsky, Michael, 135, 138
Portelli, Hughes, 59, 62, 64, 65
Powell, G. Bingham, xiii, 2, 4–5, 28, 105, 126, 137, 171–72, 181n1
Przeworski, Adam, xiii, 106, 176n20
Quermonne, Jean-Louis, 175n6
Quinn, Kevin, 171n3
Rae, Douglas, 31
Rasmussen, Jorgen, 17, 172n6
Rémond, René, 176n15
Rhee, In-je, 80
Rhee, Syngman, 77
Riker, William, 107, 125
Roberts, Geoffrey K., 27
Rochan, Thomas R., 27
Rose, Richard, 21
Rosenbluth, Frances, 137
Rubinstein, Ariel, 39
Saalfeld, Thomas, 3, 18, 19, 21, 116, 179n9
Sadoun, Marc, 73
Saiegh, Sebastian, 106
Sartori, Giovanni, 177n3
Sayers, A. M., 173n9
Schain, Martin, xiii, 61, 175n8
Schmidt, Vivien, 74
Schneider, Robert, 65, 70, 72, 176n13
Schlofield, Norman, 4, 21, 24, 28, 29, 40,
107, 126, 128, 181n1
Sharman, C., 173n9
Shin, Doh Chull, 177n22
Shugart, Matthew Soberg, 28, 31
Sigelman, Lee, 33
Singer, Judith D., 180n20
Smith, Alastair, xiii, 45
Snyder, James M., Jr., 7, 104
Spoon, Jae-Jae, 70, 76, 171n4
Strøm, Kaare, 3, 4, 6, 21, 23, 28, 29, 38, 40, 107, 108, 111, 115, 117, 118, 125, 126, 130, 131, 180n18
Sundberg, Jan, 172n4
Taagepera, Rein, 29, 31, 173n5
Therneau, T. M., 179n12
Thiès, Michael F., 107, 127, 128, 133
Thurner, Paul W., 27
Timmermans, Arco, 21, 115
Ting, Michael M., 7, 104
Tsebelis, George, 69, 117
van Deemen, A. M. A., 107
van Roozendaal, 4, 114, 121, 127
Vanberg, Georg, 4, 104, 114, 116, 117, 121, 179n11
Villalba, Bruno, 76
Vowles, Jack, 20
Willett, John B., 180n20
Williams, Philip M., 62, 71–73
Wilson, Frank L., 73
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M., 32
Wright, Gordon, 57, 64
Ysmal, Collette, 57, 62, 65
Zeng, Langche, 33, 89, 98, 177n7
accountability, xii, 3, 138
alternative vote, 20, 29, 145
asymmetric strength of coalition partners, 87, 90, 94–96, 143
Australia, 11, 15, 32, 123, 125; pre-electoral coalitions in, 14, 20, 88, 137, 145, 173n9
Austria, 11, 15, 32, 88, 109, 123, 125, 130; anti-coalition pacts in, 21; pre-electoral coalitions in, 13–14, 90
Balladur, Edouard, 73
bargaining model, 38–54, 84–85, 99, 102, 141, 174n5–10; empirical implications of, 84–88, 99, 102, 141–42; and France, 57, 59, 70, 73, 76, 82–83; and Korea, 77, 78, 82, 83
bargaining, post-electoral. See post-electoral bargaining
bargaining, pre-electoral. See pre-electoral bargaining
Belgium, 11, 15, 32, 88, 89, 109, 123, 125, 130
Campaign Manifesto Research Group. See Manifesto Research Group
Canada, 11, 14, 15, 32, 88, 90, 123, 137
caretaker government, 104, 128, 132, 144, 181n28
Chirac, Jacques, 56, 57, 65, 73, 78, 175n2, 175n4
Cho, Soon, 80
Chun Doo Hwan, 77
Chung Ju Yung, 177n23
Chung Mong Joon, 81, 177n24
coalition size, 9, 86–87, 91, 94–96, 99, 143
coding rules, 12–14, 21–22, 178n2
commitment, credible, 21, 28, 39–40, 173–74n1. See also public commitment
connected coalition, 124–25
consensus form of democracy. See proportional vision of democracy
continuum of electoral coordination, 16–17, 144
coordination failure, 2, 139; in France, 5, 56, 57, 63, 65–66, 75, 139, 176nn12–13; in Korea, 78, 79, 139
de Gaulle, Charles, 62–63, 65
delay: in forming government, 104, 114–22; in forming pre-electoral coalition, 45, 69, 76
Denmark, 11, 15, 32, 88, 109, 123, 125, 130
disproportional electoral rules, 7, 9, 87, 104, 114; and party system, 24–26; 29–36, 84, 173n1; in France, 24, 57, 58, 59, 61, 66, 68, 75, 142, 175nn2–3; in Korea, 142; and pre-electoral coalitions, 5, 8, 23–24, 42, 49, 87–88, 99, 100–102, 103, 140, 141–42, 171n2, 173n4. See also effective electoral threshold
Disproportionality Hypothesis, 8, 23, 26, 36–37, 100–102, 140; test of, 29–36, 100–102
dissolution, government ended in, 131–32, 133, 134, 135, 181n26, 181n28
distributional issues, 8, 9, 37, 39–40, 42, 141; in bargaining model, 49; in France, 59, 61, 64, 66–70, 74–75, 83; in Korea, 56, 76–78, 79, 83
district magnitude, 31, 49, 90, 99, 173
divisibility of office benefits, 39–40, 55, 59, 80–81, 83, 142
dual ballot, 19, 20, 140
duration of government formation. See delay in forming government dyads, coalition, 9, 88–89, 95, 99, 177n2, 177–78n7
effective number of electoral parties, 29, 30, 31–32, 33–36, 37, 100–102
effective number of legislative parties, 133.
See also legislative fragmentation effective electoral threshold, 31–36, 90–94, 97–99 100–102, 178n8 electoral rules, 17, 37, 83, 138. See also disproportional electoral rules electoral system, 16–20, 83, 84, 145. See also disproportional electoral rules; electoral rules
Finland, 11, 15, 32, 88, 123, 125, 130; government coalitions in, 116, 124; pre-electoral coalitions in, 13, 172n4
France, 1, 11, 14, 15, 32, 88, 99, 123, 125, 130, 137, 139; and bargaining model, 57, 59, 70, 73, 76, 82–83; coordination failure in, 5, 56, 57, 63, 65–66, 75, 139, 175n9, 176nn12–13; disproportional electoral rules in, 24, 57, 58, 59, 61, 66, 68, 75, 142, 175nn2–3; distributional issues in, 59, 61, 64, 66–70, 74–75, 83, 176nn18; electoral system in, 58–59, 145, 175n2, 176n10; electoral threshold in, 67, 68, 175n3; Fourth Republic of, 13, 63, 65, 69, 175n7–8; government coalition formation in, 116; ideological compatibility of pre-electoral coalitions in, 70–76; joint lists in, 72–73, 176n10; legislative elections in, 57–61, 66–70; nomination agreements in, 17, 39, 66–68, 145; and office, 59–70, 78; party mergers in, 59, 66, 71, 176n11; party system in, 57–59; personal animosity between party leaders in, 5, 9, 66, 75, 83, 142, 176n13; policy in, 70–75, 76, 83, 142, 176n12; presidential elections in, 9, 55–57, 58–66, 69, 70, 73, 74, 75, 83, 85, 175n6, 176n16; semi-presidential regime type of, 55, 61, 175n5; and votes, 57–59, 81 fusion candidacies, 25
geographically separate electorates, pre-electoral coalitions with, 21, 145
Germany, 11, 15, 32, 88, 109, 123, 125, 130, 139, 145; anti-coalition pacts in, 21; government coalitions in, 116, 179n9; pre-electoral coalitions in, 1, 3, 14, 17–18, 19, 20–21, 24, 27
Giscard d’Estaing, Valéry, 57–58, 64–65, 78
government coalition formation, 5, 39, 40–41, 88, 105, 143, 171n4; and identity of government, 106–14. See also delay in forming government
government identifiability, xii, 3, 28–29, 37, 105, 126, 138, 140–41, 181n1. See also Signaling Hypothesis
government survival. See government duration
government termination, 130, 180n17. See also dissolution; replacement
Greece, 11, 15, 32, 88; pre-electoral coalitions in, 14, 16, 18–19
Iceland, 11, 15, 32, 88, 109, 123, 125, 130; caretaker government in, 181n28; pre-electoral coalitions in, 14
ideological compatibility: in bargaining model, 45, 46, 49, 51; and French pre-electoral coalitions, 70–76; in government coalitions, 105, 117, 118, 121–26, 128, 131, 133, 134, 135, 181n27; in pre-electoral coalitions, 5, 86, 89, 90, 91, 98, 143, 171n6
ideological congruence between electorate and government, 105, 126, 143
ideologically extreme opposition, 41, 76,
incumbent government, 107, 117, 118, 120, 121
India, 26–27, 139, 174n2
investiture, 108, 111–12, 117–18, 120, 121, 128–29, 130, 133, 178n4
Ireland, 11, 15, 32, 88, 109, 123, 125, 130, 139; pre-electoral coalitions in, 3, 14, 20, 26–27, 145
Israel, 11, 15, 32, 88; pre-electoral coalitions in, 14, 16, 18, 37, 108, 114, 137, 141, 172–73n7
Italy, 11, 15, 32, 88, 109, 123, 125, 130; pre-electoral coalitions in, 17–18, 173n3
Japan, 11, 15, 32, 88, 123, 125; pre-electoral coalitions in, 13, 14, 172n3
joint lists, 12, 18–19, 20–21, 140, 176n10
Jospin, Lionel, 56
Kim Dae Jung, 77–82, 176n19, 177n23
Kim Jong Pil, 78–81
Kim Young Sam, 77–82, 176n19, 177n22–23
Korea, 55–56; bargaining model and, 77, 78, 82, 83, 141–42; coordination failure in, 78, 79, 139; disproportional electoral rules in, 142; distributional issues in, 56, 76–78, 79, 83; office in, 77–81; party system in, 78–79; personal animosity between party leaders in, 9, 56, 77, 79, 83, 85, 142; policy in, 77, 78–79, 82; presidential elections in, 77–82, 83, 85, 176n20; pro-democracy forces in, 78, 82; term limits in, 39, 77, 80–81, 82, 83, 142
Le Pen, Jean-Marie, xvi, 56–57, 74–75, 175n1
Lecanuet, Jean, 62
Lee Hoi Chang, 80–81
legislative fragmentation, 128, 133, 134
legitimacy, 105, 126
Luxembourg, 11, 15, 32, 88, 109, 123, 125, 130; pre-electoral coalitions in, 14, 28
Marchais, Georges, 64
majoritarian: electoral systems, 3, 24, 29–30, 145; vision of democracy, xii, 2–3, 137–38, 181n1
Malta, 11, 15, 32, 88; pre-electoral coalitions in, 14, 16, 137
mandate, xii, 3, 27–28, 105, 126, 135, 136, 138, 144
Manifesto Research Group, 16, 89, 118, 123, 124, 125, 130, 180n16
mergers, 16, 144, 171; examples of, 18–19, 59, 66, 71, 78–80, 172n7, 180n16; incentives for, 25, 30, 36, 58, 144–45
minimal winning coalition, 106, 107, 112
minority government, 111–12, 117–18, 120, 121, 128, 132
Mitterrand, François, 57, 61–64, 74, 175n2
Netherlands, 11, 15, 32, 88, 90, 109, 123, 125, 130; anti-coalition pacts in, 21; government coalitions in, 114–15; pre-electoral coalitions in, 3, 18–19, 20–21, 24, 27, 37, 99, 114, 144, 173n2
New Zealand, 11, 15, 32, 88, 123, 125; pre-electoral coalitions in, 14, 17–18, 20
nomination agreement, 1, 17–18, 20, 21, 39–40, 67–68, 140, 145, 172n6, 173n3
Norway, 11, 15, 32, 88, 109, 123, 125, 130; anti-coalition pacts in, 21; pre-electoral coalitions in, 28
number of parties: in government, 107, 116–17, 118, 120–21; in legislature, 24–46, 29, 30, 31–32, 33–36, 37, 84, 100–102, 133, 138, 140–41, 173n1 (chapter 3); in pre-electoral coalitions,
office: and bargaining model, 43–45, 76; and divisibility of benefits, 5, 37, 39–40, 42, 55, 59, 77–82, 83, 142; as goal of party leaders, 6, 38–40, 87, 141, 143

opposition: in bargaining model, 42, 44, 45–46, 49–50, 51; democratic, 77–78, 142; expected policy of, 41, 70, 73–75, 76, 82, 85, 87–88, 141, 142; use of pre-electoral coalitions by, 27, 63, 83

Park Chung Hee, 176n21
Parliamentary Democracy Data Archive (PDDA), 115, 118, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 181n28–29
party merger. See merger
personal animosity between party leaders, 5, 9, 56, 66, 75, 77, 79, 83, 85, 142, 176n13
Poher, Alain, 57, 63
policy, 137, 138, 144, 171n2, 171n5; in bargaining model, 37, 40–41, 42, 43–46, 49–51, 174n6; and forming pre-electoral coalitions, 27, 84; in France, 70–75, 76, 83, 142; as goal of party leaders, 5–6, 37, 85, 86, 87–88, 99, 141; and government coalitions, 104, 105, 116–17, 118, 121–26, 128, 133, 134, 135; in Korea, 77, 78–79, 82. See also polarization; ideological compatibility; ideologically extreme opposition
Pompidou, Georges, 57, 65
portfolios, ministerial, 39, 45, 59, 83, 104, 111, 114, 117. See also office
Portugal, 11, 32, 88, 123, 125, 130; pre-electoral coalitions in, 14, 18–19
post-electoral bargaining, 3, 5–6, 88, 140, 144, 171n3, 181n1; and duration, 114–22, 144, 180n22; and identity of government, 106
pre-electoral bargaining, 5–6, 37, 173n9
pre-electoral coalition, definition of, 12–13
pre-electoral coalition, types of, 16–21. See also fusion; joint list; nomination agreement; public commitment: not to govern together; vote transfer instructions
preferential voting, 20
presidential elections, 24, 25, 139, 142; in bargaining model, 39, 42, 43–45, 174n7; in France, 9, 55–57, 58–66, 69, 70, 73, 74, 75, 83, 85, 175n6, 176n16; in Korea, 77–82, 83, 85, 176n20
proportional: division of office benefits, 46, 76; electoral systems, 23–24, 26, 29, 30, 32, 37, 39–40, 42, 69, 114, 134–35, 141, 145, 171n2, 175n2, 176n10, 176n14, 176n17; vision of democracy, xii, 2–3, 137–38
public commitment: not to govern together, 21, 38; to govern together, 13, 20–21, 28, 45, 140
replacement government, 108, 131–32, 133, 136, 181n26
representation, 2–3, 16, 23, 105, 126, 138
Roh Moo Hyun, 81, 177n24
Roh Tae Woo, 77–80
seat share. See coalition size
signaling, 23, 26, 27, 28, 30
Signaling Hypothesis, 8, 23, 26–29, 30–32, 33–34, 36–37, 140–41
Spain, 11, 15, 32, 88, 116, 123, 130, 180n7; pre-electoral coalitions in, 13, 14, 172n2
stability. See government duration
strong party, 106, 107–8, 109, 111
Sweden, 11, 15, 32, 88, 89, 109, 123, 125, 130; pre-electoral coalitions in, 26–27, 139

Switzerland, 172n5

threshold: effective, 31–32, 33–36, 90–91, 92, 93–94, 97, 98–99 100–102, 173n5, 178n8; electoral, 19, 49, 58, 68, 104, 146, 171n2, 175n3; of representation, 16

transparency, xii, 3, 105

uncertainty, 1, 7, 29, 78, 104–5, 114, 122, 135, 144, 174n4. See also government identifiability

United Kingdom, 11, 15, 32, 88, 90, 116, 123, 130; government formation in, 114; pre-electoral coalitions in, 14, 17

United States, 25

vote transfer instructions, 19–20, 140

votes: and bargaining model, 38, 41–42, 49, 181n2; as goal of party leaders, 84, 104; and government coalitions, 1, 2–3, 114, 138, 171n3; and pre-electoral coalitions, 7, 27, 34–36, 106, 176n12

Westminster form of democracy, 137. See also majoritarian vision of democracy